The Dialectic of Discourse (1)Hypothesis, Thesis, Anti-Thesis…Syn-Thesis

In order to be able to speak OF ANY discourse [having a meaning] or, what is the same thing, Of Discourse (Logos) as such, we must begin by positing a discourse [ endowed with any meaning] whatever it may be. Because putting it down ourselves is so easy that it would make no sense to wait for it to be given to us, for example by falling from the sky, or elsewhere. But to do so, we will only ask ourselves if we actually have the (conscious and voluntary) intention to do so. That is to say that before positing it, we must presuppose it (as a discourse endowed with any meaning, not yet effectively posited, but as in front of and able to be posited by us, later). In other words, we must begin by ascertaining within ourselves the intention to speak (as well as the “will,” moreover optional or “free,” to actually do so). Or, to put it still another way, let us say that at the beginning (in an arch) the Discourse (Logos) is [for all those for whom discourse has a meaning] not a position (thesis), but a sup-position or, for say it in Greek, a


The Hypo-thesis being the intention to speak in order to say anything which nevertheless makes sense, it suffices for us to act in accordance with this intention by saying anything whatsoever (which we can, of course, refrain from indefinitely, on the condition that we do not account for our voluntary silence in and through discourse, “justifying” or otherwise), to effectively posit the Discourse as any discourse whatsoever. Now, if we do so, the discourse thus posited by us will presuppose, for us, nothing other or more than the Hypothesis, which was precisely the intention of positing the discourse in question. In other words, this discourse can be posited without having been preceded by another effective discourse, although it can only be posited in the present by supposing in the past the intention (conscious and voluntary ) to do so. We can also say that the first discourse actually emitted arises, for us, in the present, by supposing in the past a “virtual” discourse (whose “power” it “actualises”), which pre-supposes it. -supposes to be put into action” in the future. This being so, we can say that the first (actual) discourse which is posited, without sup-posing (in and by its presence in the present) any (actual) discourse emitted in the past, which would presuppose it itself, and without pre-supposing (in the same present of its presence) another discourse (actual or virtual) which would be emitted in the future by sup-posing it- this being so, we can say that this first discourse is a pure and simple position (of the Discourse as such) or, to continue speaking Greek, that this discourse “first a is a


However! If, after having occupied this first discursive position and having rested there as much as we please, we re-pose the thetic discourse in question, in order to say anything about it, we will find that by understanding its meaning whatever it is, we necessarily understand, by this very meaning, the meaning of a virtual discourse, which we could take as its “contrary” or its “negation”. And by speaking about this observation as much as necessary, we will end by saying that if, by impossibility, the “negative” or “contrary” discourse had no meaning, the “positive” or thetic discourse would also not have meaning of its own; and therefore would not be effectively posited as Discourse (by definition endowed with meaning), despite the hypo-thesis, which was the intention to speak and even an intention that we had had the feeling of having achieved. In other words, if the thetic discourse posited in the first place actually has any meaning S, Non-S is also a discursive meaning, which can consequently be that of an effective discourse so-called, having a meaning contrary to that of the thetic discourse. We. we must therefore say that the positive discourse, posited as a thesis, in fact presupposed, at the very moment of its positing, “the negative discourse” which one could call “contrary thesis”; -by presupposing this discourse if not as effective, at least as virtual or as being able to be actualised after the first “actualised” thesis, and in any case as supposing the actuality of the latter in a present which will have become past when its future will be present in the act of the second thesis “or contrary”. However! If we say all this now, we must add that at the time when it was actualised, the Thesis itself did not say it. But if, assuming the past actuality of this Thesis, we actualise in the present its discursive negation, which is the contrary “thesis”, we can and must say that this supposes the first “Thesis” as already actualised in the past. And as presupposing (in fact, if not for itself), if only as virtual, the contrary “thesis” as to be actualised in a present which was yet to come when the first Thesis was the only discourse present. Or even, to put it in a perhaps simpler way: if one can emit a Thesis (by positive definition) without speaking of the contrary Thesis, which is its negation, it is rigorously impossible to discursively deny a Thesis without explicitly mentioning it. Because if it is very easy to occupy any position that no one occupies and to lose interest in other positions occupied or not, one can occupy a position by dislodging someone only by knowing in advance where this position is or, at least, by noting it at the very moment of its occupation. When you don’t take a stand against anyone, you can very well imagine being alone in the world. But who (even if his name is Don Quixote) would want to take any position against someone he says (believing) doesn’t even exist? Be that as it may, we will say that any posited discourse provokes (sooner or later) an op-posed discourse, which means that any discursive position is opposed (actually or virtually) to an op-posed discursive position or counter-position, even to speak Greek again, to an


The Anti-thesis, which opposes the Thesis, sup-poses the latter as posited or as pre-supposing it while being posited (certainly, in the second time, that is, by the anti-thesis). If, taken and understood in itself or in its isolation (that is to say in its only connection with the Hypo-thesis), the Thesis itself does not posit and does not even pre-suppose the Anti-thesis, it nevertheless presupposes it insofar as it is itself sup-posed by the latter. Now, since the Thesis is actualised before the Anti-thesis, the latter presupposes the Thesis as already actualised or posed. The Anti-thesis can therefore only be actualised (in the present) by also actualising the Thesis, as sup-posed by it and pre-supposing it. In other words, the Anti-thesis re-poses the Thesis which, by thus re-posing itself, pre-supposes the Anti-thesis which sup-poses it. Thus, the “first” or “isolated” Thesis, which is only posed, but not yet re-posed, is sup-posed by the Anti-thesis as past. But the same thesis, as re-posited in and by the Anti-thesis as pre-supposing it, is presupposed by the latter as present, that is to say as actual in the present of the actuality of the Anti-thesis itself. In other words, if the Anti-thesis can only posit itself by opposing the Thesis, it actualises, by positing itself in the present, not only itself, but also the thesis that it re-establishes. -pose by sup- posing.

Thus, if the presence of the Thesis can be isolated or soltary, that of the Anti-thesis is necessarily, that is to say, everywhere and always, a co-presence with the thesis to which it opposes. As soon as there is the Anti-thesis, there is therefore not a single discourse (endowed with meaning), but two: Anti- thesis itself, and the Thesis that it must suppose and therefore re-pose in order to be able to oppose it in action. But, for us, these two speeches are one. Indeed, if the Anti-thesis and the Thesis can isolate themselves from the Hypo-thesis (by “forgetting it”), we must consider them both as “conforming” to the latter, even as “resulting” (discursively) from it, that is, by way of “deduction” or “inference”). The Anti-thesis can (and even must) negate the Thesis as a discourse properly speaking, that is to say, as a discourse endowed with a meaning that is by definition “coherent”. It can say that the “thesis” that it re-poses in order to oppose it is a “contradiction in terms” and that it is thus equivalent to a silence (with sound or not), devoid as such of any kind of meaning, which can only be discursive, and that any true meaning can only be “common” (even “compatible”) with the meaning of “antithetical” discourse. And the re-posited Thesis can also say as much about the antithesis that it presupposes in order to oppose it in turn. But we cannot forget the Hypo-thesis without which neither Thesis nor Anti-thesis could emerge. Now, this Hypo-thesis was the intention to say anything that made any sense. We therefore have no reason to prefer the Thesis to the Antithesis or vice versa, nor to eliminate one for the sole benefit of the other. Moreover, if the Anti-thesis were, by impossibility, right to say that the Thesis has no meaning (or, what is the same thing, that it is a pseudo-discourse which contradicts itself and therefore discursively cancels everything he says), it would lose its right to say that it itself has a meaning. For if S had no meaning, the Non-S would have even less. But, conversely, the negation of S can only be absolutely devoid of any kind of meaning if S itself had none.

Therefore, we must say, without any hesitation, that the Thesis and the Anti-thesis have one and the same reason to claim the Hypothesis. In other words, it is neither one nor the other, understood and taken in isolation, but only the two taken and understood together, which completely actualise the intention to speak in order to say anything ( sensible dex”), which was their common “hypothesis”. However! Having no (discursive) reason to prefer one of the two contrary theses to the other and therefore being unable to forget either of them completely for the exclusive benefit of the other. We can therefore speak of them validly only by restating them as a single discourse, the meaning of which can only be one. But this one and unique meaning will be “at the same time”” (that is to say, in the present where the unique discourse which re-poses the Thesis and the Anti-thesis will be present) S and No-S. Now, obviously and by definition, S has nothing in common with Not-S, so that the discourse in question will have no common sense and, consequently, no sense at all. Indeed, in this “synthetic” discourse, what will be said in the “antithetical” part whose meaning is Not-S, will contradict everything that had been said in the “thetic” part, which the “anti-thetic” part supposes. Thus the so-called “synthetic” discourse will be equivalent, at least for us, to any kind of silence, by definition devoid of any discursive meaning whatsoever. In other words, we will not be able to assign to this pseudo-discourse (yet “synthetic” or “total” in the sense that it re-unites all the “parts” of any discourse) any position in the ” Universe of discourse”. Neither that of the Thesis, nor that of the Anti-thesis; because we cannot place the Whole (by definition de-finite or “finite”) in one of these parts. Nor in any other position whatsoever, since the Whole cannot be situated elsewhere than in the set of its parts. Thus, the pseudo-discourse that has presented itself to us will not be placed in any of the possible discursive positions: it will necessarily be situated, that is to say, everywhere and always, alongside or outside of all these positions. . And we can say it in Greek (Stoic, moreover), by saying that this “third” discourse, also uttered in accordance with the one and unique discursive Hypothesis, is a


It’d be tried on another occasion.



One can begin a discursive development from S only by re-beginning that which leads to S and ends there (unless it rebegins). This shows that when one has stopped speaking after having completely developed the Syn-thesis, one has hypothetically said all that one can say without repeating oneself, following through on the intention to speak/to say anything whatever (meaningful). Thus, on the one hand, the discursive actualisation of the Syn-thesis does not prevent one from continuing to speak, since one can indefinitely re-say what one has said by actualising it. On the other hand, since this same actualisation obliges either to say nothing more, or to re-say what one has said, it is indeed an actualisation of everything that one can say in the proper sense of the word, that is, without contradicting oneself by denying everything one has said and thus reducing oneself to silence.

However, there are two (discursive) reasons why this is so. On the one hand, the Syn-thesis says all that can be said because it re-says not only what the Thesis had said at the beginning, but also what the Anti-thesis said later in contradicting this. Now, by denying everything that the Thesis affirms (explicitly or implicitly), the Anti-thesis affirms everything that this Thesis denies: not explicitly, it is true, since it denies nothing in actuality, but implicitly or in Potentia. Thus, insofar as the Thesis says something (by explicitly affirming it), the Anti-thesis says (explicitly, by affirming it) all that the latter does not say (thus implicitly denying it). Consequently, the Syn-thesis, which re-says what the Thesis and the Anti-thesis say, effectively says everything that can be said. And this is in accordance with the “Principle of excluded middle”, which says that if you want to say anything of anything, you must say either S (this S being any meaning whatsoever), or Not-S . Whence it follows that nothing else can be said of them, so that having said both, one can no longer say anything at all. Which would be true, a curious thing, even if we were ready, in order to be able to say something else, to say what contradicts itself. On the contrary, it is only because of this truly universal “principle” that one can contradict oneself (when one says something), even when one does not want to. On the other hand, if by re-saying what the Thesis and the Anti-thesis say, the Syn-thesis says all that one can say, it can say it (by re-saying the two contrary theses”) in the strong sense, that is to say without finally annulling the discourse by the fact of contradicting at the end all that was said there at the beginning.

But this is only possible because the Discourse develops in time. Indeed, a “Principle of Identity” rightly tells us that if there can be a sense in saying anything about anything, the anything that is said thus has no meaning only if we say it about what we are talking about and not about something else. What remains true even if the meaning is a “misinterpretation”, or even a “suppressed” meaning (in the sense of annulled). By saying nonsense (of meaning) about something (whatever this something), one says (implicitly) that what one speaks about is what one said insofar as one says it. What one makes explicit by saying that the something one speaks of can only “correspond” to what one says of it insofar as what one speaks of remains just as “identical to itself” (it is that is to say remains one and the same thing) “identical to itself” (that is to say is the same) as the meaning of what is said about it.

Now, this indefinite maintenance in identity with itself/oneself both of everything one says and of everything one speaks about (in so far as one speaks about it), generally incites those who speak to forget that these two identities, each one in itself, and!, are, in fact, not only an instantaneous presence in the spatial expanse, but also a temporal duration. Otherwise, one could deduce from the “Principle of [supposedly ‘eternal’ or ‘timeless’, i.e. purely spatial] identity”, taken [rightly] as a presupposition necessary to the “Principle of the excluded middle” [which says quite rightly that what would be neither S, nor Non-S, cannot be said not only nowhere, but still never], a “Principle of contradiction” which would affirm [ wrongly] that nothing can be S and Not-S (whatever S), so that to say the two of anything would be to say nothing at all and would thus be equivalent to that silence to which all discourse is reduced which would have been deprived of all its meaning (by cancelling each of its meanings by an “opposite” meaning).

It is moreover by “spatializing” the discourse and by reducing everything that is spoken of in it to a single extent, that the Thesis and the Antithesis constitute as a whole the Para-thesis which, by developing completely, cancels itself as meaningful speech, contradicting itself everything it says. The Para-thesis is finally reduced to silence (in accordance with the “Principle of contradiction”) by trying to pose in the only extension (that is to say simultaneously, for lack of being able to do it outside of duration or in the ” eternity”) the meaning of the Thesis and that of the Anti-thesis; and it remains forever silent (in accordance with the “Principle of the excluded middle”), for lack of being able to pose anywhere and anytime a meaning that would be other than those of the Thesis or the Anti-thesis. Which means that it would be absolutely impossible to say anything (with meaning, or even with “sense”) if you had no time to do so. And the fact is that any discourse whatsoever has everywhere and always, that is to say necessarily, a certain duration (which is, moreover, a certain duration, in the sense of being measurable). Now, very fortunately for the Discourse, we have plenty of time to update it. And having a certain time, we can actualise it as Syn-thesis.

Provided that the formula of the “Principle of contradiction” is amended in such a way as to take account of the fact that it takes time to say anything (meaningful) and that, consequently, one can only speak of what is also in time, even if it means lasting there in such a way as to remain identical to itself (at least insofar as one speaks of it) as long as the meaning of what one says “is”. It will then be necessary (what is commonly said, without, however, always drawing all the consequences) that nothing can be such that there is a meaning in saying (without contradicting itself) that this is S and Not-S “is” at the same time. On the other hand, we never contradict ourselves anywhere (and we even sometimes say very sensible things) by saying, in the Present, that what was only S in the Past, will now only be Non-S in the future. If you have any doubts, let’s get back to coffee. Instead of saying to the boy like the other time: “Bring me beer, but don’t bring it to me”, I will say to him this time: “Bring me beer, but don’t bring it to me before half an hour”. And you will see that he will be very surprised (perhaps even furious, if he [wrongly] perceives a touch of irony on my part), but will not consider me crazy in any way and will (probably) bring the beer (maybe even “immediately”). Now, if we agree on this point, everything else flows from the source.

If the Syn-thesis says everything that can be said (without contradicting itself), this is done neither by the Thesis nor by the Anti-thesis. Because the Thesis does not say what the Anti-thesis says and the latter only re-says what the former says by contradicting it. As for the Para-thesis, it only claims to say everything, but in fact it does not do so, since, taken and understood as a whole, it says nothing at all. Thus, if one wanted to stop at the Para-thesis, all the discourse uttered until then would be reduced to silence and the intention of speaking about the Hypo-thesis would not be realised and could never be realised. By closing the discursive circuit by returning to the Hypo-thesis from the Para-thesis, one obtains a circuit that is too short, which is in fact only a short-circuit. Instead of actualising the Hypothesis, we would have its total cancellation; instead of a discursive development, there would be a permanent silence. And there would be nothing surprising there, since one can speak only in Time and since Time is introduced into Discourse only in and by Syn-thesis (although Discourse itself is always done in time, which allows it to last and only to be cancelled as meaning after the Para-thesis was developed for a long time, in opposites).

In other words, only the Syn-thesis completely realises the “primordial” intention of speaking or, in other words, perfectly actualises the Hypothesis of the Discourse whatever it is or as such. Indeed, the Thesis does not by itself exhaust the discursive possibilities, since, by not saying itself what the Anti-thesis will say, it does not say everything that can be said. Moreover, the Thesis virtually surpasses its own “thesis”, since the latter will provoke (sooner or later, but necessarily, that is to say everywhere and always) the “contrary thesis” which is the Anti -thesis. For if it didn’t, what it said didn’t have a meaning that could be denied (in a discursive or sensible way), which means that it wouldn’t have any meaning at all and therefore wouldn’t be real speech. (“consistent with the hypothesis”). But, by actualizing itself, the Anti-thesis provoked by the Thesis does not actualise by itself either the totality of the Discourse that is “in potency” qua Hypo-thesis. For by saying everything that the Thesis does not say, it re-says what the Thesis said only to contradict it or deny it, that is to say, to annul it as a discourse endowed with meaning [which it does by affirming, moreover wrongly, that which the thetic discourse said itself in the final analysis]. Moreover, the whole of the virtual Discourse that is the Hypothesis can only be actualized completely or perfectly in and by the whole of the thetic and antithetical discourses. It is this integral or integrating actualisation that begins as Para-thesis. But it fails in coming to an end, because the whole of the para-thetic discursive development effectively contradicts itself and therefore annuls its own meaning, so that the completed Para-thesis is no longer a discourse at all (not even in power). Now, we have seen that the attempt at integration or para-thetic synthesis fails because the Para-thesis, while developing itself discursively and therefore, in fact, in the extended duration of the Universe [which allows it to cancel itself out, by contradicting itself, only after a certain time, more or less long, moreover], speaks only of what, for it, extends without really lasting [being “instantaneous” or “eternal”, that is to say, situated in a stationary “instant” even spatialized (nunc stans)], or of what co-exists only, without ever preceding nor following itself anywhere. This is how the Para-thesis speaks of Thesis and Anti-thesis. And this is why, by trying to say everything “at the same time” (that is to say, at the same time), (( the Para-thesis ends by noting what it cannot say: neither what the Thesis had said, nor what the Anti-thesis said while contradicting it. Now, the Syn-thesis succeeds precisely where the Para-thesis fails. It re-says what the Thesis and the Anti-thesis had said, and it can do so without what one of the two said contradicting or discursively cancelling everything that the other had said, because it re-says the one after the other, taking into account and rendering the account discursively, by repeating them both, not without the deep “meaning” involved in the fact that the one is posterior to the other. It thus says effectively (without contradicting itself) not only all that the Anti-thesis said by contradicting all that the Thesis had said, but also all that the latter said at a time when nothing yet contradicted it. And that is why it says, while re-saying it, all that one can say without contradicting oneself, thus actualising in and by one and the same discourse which is its own, the totality of the Potential Discourse which it presupposes as a Hypothesis, or as an intention to speak in order to say anything and therefore everything that has any common sense (as meaning).

If the actualisation of the Hypo-thesis by the Thesis, the Anti-thesis and the Para-thesis introduces the Discourse into the extended duration of the Universe, it is the Syn-thesis alone which introduces this extended duration into the Discourse, insofar as the latter is actualised as this synthetic, integral or uni-total discourse that it is itself as long as it lasts and extends. It is by this “temporalisation” of the meaning of the discourse that it is itself (and which is “temporal”, as are all discourses whatever they may be) that the Syn-thesis differs essentially from the Thesis, the Antithesis and the Para-thesis. It is maintaining itself as discourse not only “for a time” (that is, during the time that a discourse is not contradicted, neither by itself nor by another discourse), but all the time that it has been, is and will be what it is, that is to say, discourse endowed with a meaning that does not contradict itself (neither by itself, nor by a counter-sense-saying). By saying (explicitly) that everything one speaks of (without contradicting oneself) is S and S only (which means, implicitly, that one cannot speak of anything as a Not-S), the Thesis, which in fact says it in a hic et nunc of the extended duration of the Universe or of the World-where-one-speaks, does not itself bind to this hic et nunc, in its own discourse, nor this speech itself, nor the meaning of what is said there. It is the same for the Anti-thesis when it says (explicitly) that, nothing of what one speaks (without contradicting oneself) being able to be S, one can say nothing, except that everything is No -S. Because in saying it, one could neither say what should not be said, nor when one said what one should. (???) Now, if neither the Thesis nor the Anti-thesis situate themselves, in the extended duration in which they are actualized (in different hic et nunc) as discourse, neither what they speak of, nor what they say about it (by contradicting one another), the Para-thesis does not do so either when it speaks of what it had said, and it does not situate itself either. -even in the extended duration in which it is actualised (in a hic et nunc distinct from the preceding ones), neither as such, nor in relation to the Thesis and the Anti-thesis of which it speaks. The Para-thesis therefore results in the Silence of the contra-diction because it can neither situate the Thesis (or the meaning of what it says) before or after the Anti-thesis (or the meaning of what it says), nor situating itself after or before them. And this is how it is inevitably led to mean all “at the same time” [and not even “at the same time”, to tell the truth, since what has neither “before” nor “after is not in “time”, nor therefore in the “present”, unless it is a question of the so-called “present” of a so-called “eternal presence”], which forces, in the end, to say nothing at all [after having vainly, but for a long time, tried to say “partially” anything].

Quite different, on the other hand, is synthetic discourse. On the one hand, the Syn-thesis situates itself, in the extended duration of the Universe where it is actualised, after the Para-thesis which, for it, is preceded by the Anti-thesis, which precedes the thesis. And the Syn-thesis thus situates itself, in the extended duration where the hic et nunc of its own discursive actualisation is situated, not only as the effective discourse that it is, but also as the meaning of this discourse. In other words, the Syn-thesis is not only, like all discourses whatever they may be, a temporal discourse, but also a “temporalised” discourse. When the Syn-thesis begins its discursive development (that is, its actualisation), it re-says everything that the Thesis had said without modifying or adding anything to it; -except the assertion that what it re-says (as Syn-thesis) has been said (by the Thesis), as not contradicted (by the Anti-thesis), only in and for the past. Having said all this, the Syn-thesis continues its development by restating all that the Anti-thesis had said, without modifying it and adding only the assertion that it is only in and for the Present of its actuality that the Anti-thesis contradicted everything that the Thesis had previously said and affirmed, therefore, becoming the opposite of everything that the latter said. Now, by the very fact that the Syn-thesis says so, everything that the Para-thesis said before it becomes “without-objects, since the latter spoke only of the (spatial) co-existence of the Thesis and of the Anti-thesis, disregarding the fact of their (temporal) succession. The Syn-thesis might not re-say the Para-thesis at all, since the latter itself says nothing at all, having previously reduced itself to silence, by not re-saying either what the Anti-thesis said before it, nor what the Thesis had said before it, only contradicting everything that it itself had said. In other words, in synthetic repetition, the Para-thesis (which has reduced itself to silence by contradicting itself) could be present only in and by what the Synthesis does not say (and this which cannot be said without contradicting itself). But the Syn-thesis could just as well re-say everything that the Para-thesis had said, without contradicting itself for all that, since it would re-say the para-thetical sayings by temporising them, that is to say, by situating them, in relation to synthetic discourse, in a past which was a future for the Antithesis which contradicted the Thesis which had preceded it in time. As for the Syn-thesis itself, it completes its own discursive development or is completely actualised as such, by adding to what it has re-said that everything it says is said in its present for any future: because what it says here and now can never be contradicted anywhere, since it does not contradict anything itself and it not only re-says everything that has been said (in the past) as being able to be contradicted (in a present yet to come), but still everything that was said (in a present already past) by contradicting it (as co-present) . The temporalisation” of the Discourse aside, the Syn-thesis only re-says what the Anti-thesis said “in its time”, which itself re-says the Thesis by contradicting it (the two thus saying together all that one can say). The Syn-thesis is therefore nothing other, nor more, but nothing less either, than the “temporalised” Anti-thesis, that is to say, the Anti-Thesis being situated in a Present (of the extended duration of the Universe) which is also the Future, because in relation to it (as well as in and for itself) the Thesis is only the Past.

This is how the Syn-thesis differs not only from the Thesis, since it re-says what the Anti-thesis had said and what the Thesis did not say, but also from the Anti-thesis, since in re-saying it, it no longer contradicts what the Thesis said as the Anti-thesis had done (but only re-says it, like a “past thesis”). And it differs finally from the Para-thesis, because the latter did not manage to re-say, neither what the Anti-thesis said, nor what the Thesis had said, while the Syn-thesis re-says itself (successively) what one and the other said. The Syn-thesis re-says everything that the authentic Thesis said, that is to say, the discourse that said everything that was not (yet) contradicted; but it re-says it as no longer being contradicted, because it has already passed. And it re-says everything that the authentic Anti-thesis said; but it re-says it without contradicting anything, because at the moment it re-says it, everything that could be contradicted by re-saying the Antithesis, is no longer said at all, having only been said in the past. In short, the Syn-thesis is the future of the Anti-thesis which is present without any Thesis other than that of a definitive past. Thus, the Syn-thesis cancels the Thesis and the Anti-thesis as co-present; but it preserves the Thesis as past and sublimates it as negated by the Anti-thesis, which is also annulled as contradicting the Thesis, but preserved in what it presently affirms and sublimated, insofar as it is henceforth alone to say it, without contradicting anything, nor being itself contradicted. And it is as annulled, preserved and sublimated by “temporalization” (even “dialectically suppressed: aufgehoben) that Thesis and Anti-thesis indefinitely maintain their discursive presence in the Present of the extended duration of the Universe where they are actualised; and this as one and the same Syn-thesis, which is the fully developed Discourse or the fully actualised Hypo-thesis.

In short, the Discourse in potency (that is to say, the Intention-to-speak, sup-posed discursively as a Hypothesis) is actualised during an effective discursive process, which lasts and extending. This process begins with the actualization of the thetic discourse, which says that everything (what we talk about) is S (whatever this S) and that nothing (what we talk about) is Not-S. For a time, no speech contradicts what this first speech says. Then comes a moment when a second discourse is actualised, which is antithetical because it contradicts everything that was said by the first: it says that nothing (of what we speak) is S and that, consequently, everything (what we talk about) is Non-S. The co-existence or co-presence of these two contrary discourses in the Present relegates to the Past the solitary presence or existence of the Thesis, while the possible presence of the Anti-thesis only is still situated in the Past. In the course of their co-presence, the contrary theses discursively cancel each other out. Thus, taken and understood as a whole, the discourses actualised until now are reduced to the purely virtual Discourse of the discursive origin: everything that is said, in the Present, by contradicting itself, is only hypothetical, and the Discourse as such de-actualises itself to re-become the virtual or potential Discourse that is the discursive Hypo-thesis or the Intention-to-speak. If this discursive-Intention or this Discourse-to-come is also actualised in the extended-duration, it CAN be presented as a re-telling of the Thesis (assuming that whoever will re-present it in the Present [with a view to the Future] will be able to completely forget the Past, which also implied what was to come when the Thesis it now re-presents presented itself for the first time). In this case, the discursive process is re-produced as it is; and it CAN re-occur in this way “indefinitely”. The Discourse as such will then remain everywhere and always hypothetical, we will speak “endlessly” according to the discursive-Intention, that is to say, the desire to say something; but, in fact, nothing will be said. For the Discourse never being finished, its meaning will always remain in-definite or not “definite”. This discourse will be constantly actualised in a present to come or already past, but it will never be in action in the present. A day MAY come, however, when the Hypo-thesis will be actualised not by a thetic discourse which does not yet deny anything, nor by an antithetical discourse which affirms only to contradict, nor even by para-thetics discourses, where all the contrary theses mutually contradict each other, thus canceling everything that can be said, but by a single discourse that says everything while contradicting nothing. This synthetic discourse can only re-say what the Anti-thesis said. But, as a result, it will also re-say the Thesis, which has already been re-spoken by the Anti-thesis, due to the fact that it was denied by the latter. Only, by relegating the Thesis to a Past without a presence to come, the synthetic discourse will not contradict it (with a view to the Future) in the Present where it will itself be present, contrary to what the Anti-thesis did when its own presence was a Present. Thus, the actuality or the effective presence of the Syn-thesis relegates to a Past (without present future) not only the Thesis without Anti-thesis, but also the latter, insofar as it contradicts by its presence the Thesis as a Thesis still present and not already past, as well as the Para-thesis, which presents itself only to re-present as co-present, to itself and between them, the Thesis and the Anti-thesis . Now, if the co-presence of the Thesis and the Anti-thesis (one of which is prior to the other, but which together exhaust all the possibilities of the Discourse as such), what is the presence of the Para-thesis (which is the set of discourses whatever they may be, reduced to the state of Virtual Discourse or Discursive Hypo-thesis, that is to say, reduced to the sole Intention-to -speak, constantly renewing itself, but never realising itself), is henceforth only a Past in relation to the Present where the Syn-thesis presents itself, & where this Present can have no other discursive Future than that of an “indefinite” re-presentation of this Syn-thesis itself. For unless we suppose that a fine day will come, when all will cease to understand in the evening not only all that had been said in the distant past, but also all that was still said on the morning of this very day, nothing can no longer be said without saying (or being able to say) that what is said, re-says what has been said, given that everything has already been said. But since we could say everything without contradicting anything, we haven’t contradicted what we said either. The Syn-thesis, which does not contradict anything, does not therefore cancel itself out as discourse, but is presented as a discourse in action. And since it re-says everything, it is any Discourse or Discourse as such that has been actualised in and by the actuality of the Syn-thesis. In other words, the Discourse ceases to be Hypo-thesis as soon as it is actualised as Syn-thesis (but not before). From now on, the Discourse in potential sup-poses the Discourse in action (which presupposes it): one can no longer have in the Present an intention to speak, in or for the Future, except with a view to re-saying ( in whole or in part) what has already been said in the Past. In a Past, moreover, where one contradicted, in a certain present, everything that one had said (in the past) in order to contradict everything that had been said before; so that all were silenced there by and for all. In the presence of such a contradictory or para-thetical universal silence, the desire was born to say in one and the same synthetic discourse all that one can say, without contradicting anything more. At the cost of great efforts, this discursive desire was one day fully and definitively satisfied. But since then, it is now enough to have it, to be able to satisfy it easily.

That said, I would like to sum up everything I previously said about the Dialectic in a single word, borrowed from Hegel’s own vocabulary. We have, in fact, said everything about “the Hegelian Dialectic” by saying that this Dialectic is an Aufhebung. Unfortunately, no translation of this common German word can render its triple meaning: suppression or cancellation, preservation and elevation or sublimation. This is why I am obliged to replace it with an artificial technical term, moreover compound, such as “dialectic-overcoming” for example. But we might find a much better solution. Be that as it may, we effectively sum up everything that can be said (without contradicting oneself) when speaking of the Dialectic (if not discovery, at least one which was definitively and completely brought to light by Hegel), if one says that the Syn-thesis dialectically suppresses the Thesis and the Anti-thesis (the Para-thesis “suppressing” itself in a non-” dialectical” manner, that is to say without “preserving” or “rising” above anything, including itself). Indeed, the Syn-thesis PRESERVES the Thesis, as one “conserves” the Past by “keeping” its memory (Er-innerung); but it REMOVES (in the sense of canceling) the Anti-thesis as a “contrary thesis”, even as a “negative” or “negative” Thesis of “Nihilism”, which does not present itself (anymore) in the actuality of the Present only to contradict what is actually said there in its very presence; it is thus that it RAISE itself above the Thesis (which it suppresses as present, but preserves, for the present to come, as past) and the Anti-thesis (which it suppresses in its negating presence, but retains for the future as re-saying everything it had said in its past, without however contradicting anything in its present), thereby RAISING the Thesis and the Anti-thesis above themselves, insofar as the Syn-thesis is itself this same ex-Antithesis, which henceforth no longer contradicts the Thesis, although it continues to suppose it in the future as having been contradicted by it in a present which is now definitively past.


For a much larger discussion, where the history of philosophy itself unfolds itself through thus scheme – a text of 15, 000 words or so, you could try to see:


Poetry’s Birth into the Polis

The Olympia, “sporting world” is a human world, we can live there; it is even at first glance perfect since it is out there, on high, where a “world champion” exists, that is to say, where a man is universally recognised in his particularity as a result of a struggle. But this sporting struggle lacks seriousness (no risk of life), and what is more, man is only recognised here as equal to his body or physical performance. He is an object. The imperfection, therefore of the “sporting world”: it does not include real individuality (integral) and therefore no real “satisfaction.”

All Literature is the creator of a World. The pagan literary world (religious) starts with the Epic, lives in Tragedy and dies as a Comedy. Hence three dialectical stages: (1) The Epic: the executives of this World; (2) The Tragedy: the actor who acts within these frameworks; (3) The Comedy: the result of this actor’s action. The real action of the real man.


The Epic World

1st paragraph: First union of peoples under a political entity or a nation for a common goal, for example, the Trojan War. This unity was achieved only by exclusion (union against …). Its action is not the result of the “essence” of this World: there is no universal State, no Empire.

2nd paragraph: Analysis of the Epic World. It is total; you can live there. But there is an Oberbefehl – a supreme command- and not Oberherrschaft supreme sovereignty: a single command, but no single government. This is reflected in the Pantheon. (Sensation stage, not yet Perception-Tragedy or Understanding-Comedy. There is no real, unique Hero (of Actor): when he appears, he will have to destroy this union; it will be Tragedy. Then the conflict between the Universal and the Particular, which is latent in the World of “sacred union”, will plainly manifest itself.

3nd paragraph: This World reveals itself to Man through the Epic. Der Schluss (the “Syllogism”) of the Epic:

c.a) das Extrem der Allgemeinheit = die Gôtterwelt;

c.b) die Mitte (Besonderheit) – = das Volk in seinem Helden;

c.c) das Extrem der Einzelkeit = der Sânger.

The People, acting through their Heroes and individualised in them, serves as a middle ground between Olympus, representing the Universal, and the epic Cantor who embodies the Individual. The Sânger cries out this World and out of this world. He does not reproduce it. No “realism”. The Gods act (new element compared to the above: before (in Art) Man became aware of himself as a being, now (in Literature) he becomes aware of himself as an Action).

4th paragraph: the action of the epic Hero. (P. 508, L 11: “Synthetische” here means “juxtaposed”, because there is no true synthesis yet.) It will destroy the calm of the Nation, its (pseudo) synthesis, and manifest its internal contradiction: it is not a State which presides over the victorious coalition of Nations; it is not a particular Nation which is victorious, but the United Nations. So: either we eliminate the victory, or the different Nations, by integrating them into an Empire. In both cases. it’s the end of the Epic World.

5th paragraph; the epic conflict is also manifested in the divine world of the Epic. It is funny to see the gods forget in their quarrels their eternal nature: why do they fight if there is no victory that could have changed their nature? It is a simple game with no result or success.

Silence of the animal (and of the Athlete) – * Literature – * Absolute knowledge. Isolated particularity Nation – * Empire.

The Nation, in order to realize itself, “suppresses” itself by and into the Empire. The first Empire: that of Alexander, who is the first tragic Hero (the Actor); Alexander fails because he tries to achieve Empire in a World of Masters, and not of Citizens (as Napoleon will).


The Tragedy (pp. 509,1. 2 from the bottom – 517)

(Aeschylus. “Oresty” is the basis of the analysis; cf. also Chap. VL A, a-ii.)

New and important character: the second Actor, hence the actor or even the mask.

The Tragedy manifests the conflict between the Particular and the Universal in the World of the Pagan Masters: an insoluble conflict. After the “United Nations” epic victory, the coalition dissolved, each people is a closed political entity in itself. The Universal is fragmented but is maintained because each person (and each man) finds the contradiction between universal action and particularist activity. In the Epic World, the conflict seemed external and blotted out; now, in the tragic world, it becomes necessary, manifest and essential.

(By “Notwendigkeit”, we must understand here Destiny, that is to say, the Empire to which the Nations or Peoples would be integrated. Extrem: Imperial Destiny, represented by the gods; Just before the Tragedy \ Mitte: the Nation or the Heroic People; we had the Extrem: the Rhapsode, which sees the Epic “Syllogism”: born of the Empire and understands it, announces it: but by that it excludes itself from the Nation and is annihilated. In the Tragedy, the Actor, in whom the two “extremes” are actualized, appears. (The author who understands Destiny must become active). The Actor sees the solution to the conflict but cannot (otherwise, he would be Alexander) achieve it. But the action of the tragic Actor is obviously imaginary. The pinnacle of the art will be the Comedy in which the Actor acts exactly as a man acts in everyday life. So art removes itself; we go to real life.

The Epic Hero was silent; it was the Rhapsode who spoke for him (recounted it). The tragic hero speaks; the Actor speaks for himself and takes his mask.

In the Epic, you have to know what’s going on; in the Tragedy, – what is said. In the foreign war (epic), there is no need to speak; in the (tragic) civil war: speech. P. 511, paragraph: “Der allgemeinen Boden” … etc.

Three constitutive elements of the Tragedy: 1) the Choir; 2) the Actor; 3) Spectators.

The first condition of the tragic situation: the People (“Choir) is passive. Action that is not his. He sees the two Heroes (Actors) going to their ruin without being able to intervene. He sees the conflict but does not see the possibility of resolving it and laments. It is the most tragic character of the Tragedy, and also the author as being in solidarity with the Choir.

The Choir knows that the end of the Action will be tragic, and yet it makes the Hero act. The situation is analogous to the Mystical Religion: the Hero is a scapegoat. But this is not serious; we obviously do not kill the actor, and finally the conflict will be resolved in that the Hero will lose the tragic quality to become comic.

There can only be two Actors in the Tragedy, no third since no “medium term” would resolve the conflict. So only one tragic Author: Aeschylus.

A reminder of Chapter VI, A, a-b. – The Society (the Wesen of the Society) of Masters is contradictory in itself and, in actuality, we, therefore, make it disappear. This Action I perform inside a closed world is criminal: the civil war, particularly the crime par excellence. The polytheism of the Epic becomes in the Tragedy a dualism: the superior gods of the City, and the infernal gods, the gods of the Family. Apollo, Zeus, Athena on the one hand; on the other, the Erinyes, – in Orestia.



The sacrifice of Iphigenia manifests the contradiction between the State and the Family. By the murder of Agamemnon, the very principle of Kingship = State) is suppressed, and the Family tales the place of the State (Aegisthus is not a King.) By destroying the Family (by killing the mother), Orestes wants to restore the Kingship to his father by becoming King himself: for Agamemnon will become King’s father and will thus be King. The infernal gods will kill Orestes. There is no solution. Aeschylus disavows Agamemnon. The “domestication” of the Erinnyes equals the transformation of Tragedy into Comedy).

P. 514, last L: “Das Bewusstsein schloss” … etc.

The important word here is Betrug (deception or imposture; hypocrisy). The deception, the imposture of the-Tragedy: the Master believes and wants to make believe that he is entirely Master, which also means that, in his activity as a Master, he completely exhausts the human essence and his own life. It is an error that subsequently becomes a fraud.

Because it is not a question of eliminating the particularism in front of universalism, but of uniting them: the life of Master which excludes the Particularity is impossible. What does the Tragedy finally reveal? That, in his action of universalist intention, the Master actually acts under Particular Boundaries. Obviously, the nature of Master (his “character”) is a particular nature (since different from that of the Slave, of the Woman) and therefore limited. The Master who claims to the Universal puts forward as much of the Individual as the one who openly stands in solidarity with the Individual (with the Family).

The Master who acts as a Master cannot avoid Tragedy, nor the imposture of Tragedy. The ideal of the Master is not viable: one can only die as a Master. The Master who claims to live qua Master is nothing more than an Impostor. He plays a tragic role; it is a “hypocrisy”. Tragedy cannot stand as such; it must disappear as a literary genre (giving way to the Comedy – * Roman).

The solution proposed by Aeschylus: peace, the inactivity of the State (or foreign war: which would be the return to the Epic).

So: the transformation of a warrior state of Masters into a bourgeois “democracy”: Comedy.

See the analogy between the end of the Orestia of Aeschylus and the end of the Peace of Aristophanes. We will see that Aristophanes is an already-Bourgeois who yearns for the past Mastery and that Aeschylus is a still-Master who yearns for the coming Bourgeoisie.

Another result of the Tragedy: the depopulation of the sky. Only Zeus remains, but he is already the god of the Family, of the home. In fact, the Erinnyes triumphed over Apollo and Athena; the peace treaty between them actually suppresses the Poliad divinities. But also it’s a victory for Athena because the Erinnyes become citizens, – which is already funny.

The Tragic Hero is a Bourgeois who has taken the mask (“hypocrite”) and puts it down after the Tragedy. Because there is no real life of Master, but only a “role” of Master, a play. This game becomes conscious and avowed in comedy.

Hegel – Intellectual Tragedy.

With Hegel, the only modern plays to be considered as tragedies are intellectual tragedies: Hamlet and Faust. Stated otherwise, this type of Tragedy (bourgeois or Christian) is a tragedy of inaction. The Tragedy of the Pagan Master, on the other hand, is a tragedy of action. The Intellectual can be tragic because, by not working, he resembles the Master. But the hero so-called does not fight either, thus resembling the Slave (he is Bourgeois »a Slave without a Master). So: the modern play is either a Tragedy of inaction or Comedy of “peaceful”, even pacifist idleness. Clearly, Shakespeare takes the pen and writes himself into the Hegelian category of the modern.

פילוסופיה בטוויטר? טוויטטויט.

כמו נגיד את כל האונוטולוגיה ההגליאנית במשפט- אם מרחביות היא ההוויה עצמה, הזמניות היא השונות בין הוויה לאין (שונות זו אינו אלא ה”זהות” שלהם כ”תנועה”

קרא עוד »

הערות שהיו סתם. שיהיו.

הערות שהיו סתם. שיהיו. ״רופאים החותכים, שורפים, דוקרים ומענים חולים, דורשים על כך שכר שלא מגיע להם לקבל״. הרקליטוס על רופאי שיניים (נערך שם, שם).מילים

קרא עוד »


הערה על פילון [[[בגלל שהוא בכל זאת יהודי לא עלינו, וזה קצר, ולא הכי פילוסופי בעולם (מבחינת שפה לפחות, אבל לא רק), אני תרגמתי (לא

קרא עוד »

אד הומינם

“כל טיעון אד הומינם הוא טיעון דיאלקטי.” עכשיו מה זה טיעון אד הומינם? חלק ממכם יידעו את זה. מהו טיעון אד הומינם? תלמיד: טיעון המכוון

קרא עוד »

על אגרטל או כסא או משהו

תחשוב על אגרטל לרגע. האגרטל נפל לי מהיד. הוא נשבר לרסיסים וכל מיני חלקים. איפה האגרטל? הוא לא בידיים שלי. הוא גם לא ממש על הרצפה. הוא בשום מקום ממש. ומצד שני, האגרטל לא נהיה כלום. יש לנו את הרסיסים האלה על הרצפה ויש לנו גם את השברים האלה. יש לנו את תודעת השינוי שפתאום הופכת גם את האגרטל לעוד יותר אגרטל מאשר מה שהיה לפני כן, שעה שלקחנו את הדבר הזה, מה שהוא לא נהיה כי היה קודם אבל לא בעכשיו ממש, בתפיסה אלא הדבר הזה שיש עליו אבק. ואיזו אישה אמרה לנו לנקות. זה היה אבק מקודם.

סתם ניקינו כי שברנו. אבל הכי חשוב: אין קשר בין הקיום של הרעיון של האגרטל לקיום של האגרטל כאן, למרות שהכל מתחיל בקיום זה, בכל פרוייקט הגדרה. בכל התייחסות לעולם. אחרת, העולם הוא לא טבע או נתון. הוא קסם. אלוהים מדבר. זאת המהפכה הגדולה של היוונים.

אפשר ללכת ישר לאלוהים, אבל אפשר לומר גם כי העובדה שאין קשר בין אובייקט כקיום לרעיון כדבר שיש מן האפשר לדברו, הוא בבסיס הנראויות השונות כחיפוש אחרי אלוהים כהסבר לעומת לוגוס. או השיעמום של קוהלת מעולם התופעות כאילו אלוהים שותק כי מאפשר את הלוגי/לוגוס. אבל חלאס לאתונה מול ירושלים. בוא נחזור לאגרטל.

איפה הוא? בדיוק. כל זה כדי לומר כי די להפריד אותו מההיק כדי שהוא יהיה מנותק מהנאנק מבלי שינקנק את דרכו מעולמנו כרעיון. לכן, החשיבות של הפילוסופיה, בכל הכרוך בשפה: היא נעוצה מלכתחילה בשחרור הקל מהאמפירי או מהקשר בין מובן למהות.

במילים אחרות, אין זה אומר שהניתוק הוא מהזמן כמו שהניתוק הוא מההבניה של מקום כמובנת למקום. בוא נקח דוגמא אחרת? למה לא כמו שמרגול שרה, תגיד לי למה לא, בשבילי וגם בשבילו וגם בשביל ניסים קלדרון וחזונו לשירה העברית! אבל למה לנו אותו? אז דוגמא אחרת? למה לא? תגיד לי למה לא?

כל מבנה השוק הקפיטליסטי מבוסס או על עבודה או על כסף והקשר ביניהם. הדבר הכי חשוב לגבי הרכוש המודרני הוא עצמאותו מההיק את נאנק במובן של רכוש קלאסי אריסטוקרטי. שם יש חופשיות משימוש, לא ממקום והחופש ממקום הוא בין היש ללא יש וכל הלא-יש עובדים כעבדים אצל היש רכוש. התירוץ שם לעבודה הוא הסיכון ההתחלתי. הם מאסטרים. הם הצבא. הרכוש בכלל משותף לכל היש כחלק מהמלך. למעשה, הרכוש מול אי הרכוש הוא אף כה מדומיין שם משאלת הבעלות כי עד כדי כך קשור לשלי המוגדר, כשם שהוא מגודר, והכסף זה בדיוק עולמם של ניידים. כל היתר נייחים.

גדי טאוב במאמר מוסגר, צריך לסגור אנשים לפעמים פתוחים, חכם במובן של הלא טיפש, כאשר הסתמך על טיפש כישעיהו ברלין, הכותב ניידים נייחים על עצמו בהקשר של האצולה הרוסית הכותבת רומנים שלעולם לא הבין כי זה לא לו. טוב. לא היה אז אלנבי. והאליטה הישראלית לא ראויה לעבוד באלנבי. מעריצה בברלין. בוא נחזור לעניין.

הקפיטליזם הוא לא רכוש קונה רכוש, כמו שאדם סמית כתב אותו, כשההצדקה לכסף כבעלות היא הצדקת העבודה או האחריות. במובן העמוק, כולם עבדים. במובן החשוב, עדיף לבחור את עבדותך לכסף כאחריות מאשר להיות עבד לבעלים. כל עבודה מכבדת את בעליה. לכן תהיה הבעלים. הזמן קשור מאד לבעלות. כמו כל מערכת החליפין הקשורה בבסיסה לזמן העבודה האמיתי או המדומיין כי גם הייצור הוא עצמאי מהדבורה שעושה כל הזמן אותו דבר, במקום. האדם משנה את מקומו בפרפרזה על מרקס, על פי רעיון/פרוייקט כי זה לא על המקום.

אם זה לא כל המקום, אז נלך למקום אחר: זה נהיה כל מקום מקום כי באלוהי הדולר אנו בוטחים, כן: הקפיטל הוא על הקפיטל.

כל זה כדי לומר לעצמי?! למי קראתי זיין שכל כשקראתי את הדבר הבא בהעדר אמונה או שתהיתי בקול, באופן תרבותי לעצמי, על מה זה כל הזבל הזה. זה פאקינג גאוני! אף מרמת השפים. לשפיים:

Let us note first of all that it is not necessary, in order to transform a thingistic Reality into a (virtual) Sense of a (future) Notion, to detach it separately from its hic and its nunc. It suffices, in fact, that it would be detached from the hic so that or rather ipso facto, it would be deatched from the nunc. conversely, to detach it from the nunc is to automatically detach it, by that very fact, from the hic.

Of course, it is not a matter of detaching a (“natural”) Thing from its given hic in order to situate it in some other hic. It is certainly not by moving Things in any way in space that we transform them into Notions. In order for it to become (and be) Notion, the thingistic Reality must (first) be detached from any hic whatsoever (the thingistic Reality itself not being, moreover, in any way affected by this “Secondment”). For a Thing to exist somewhere as a Notion, it must not (first) be (in existence) anywhere (while being able to remain and exist, as a Thing, where it is). Now, a thingistic Reality which exists in a given nunc necessarily exists somewhere.

A Reality that does not exist anywhere, that does not have a hic, could therefore not exist at any given moment of time: it would have no nunc and therefore would never exist. Not existing anywhere, never coming into existence, it wouldn’t exist at all. It can only be “something” by subsisting “outside” the hic et nunc, as “detached” from its hic et nunc and from all hic et nunc. It is therefore sufficient that a Thing is “detached” from its hic without being located in any other hic in order that it would be transformed by this single fact into Sense, capable of existing in the hic et nunc of the Morpheme of a Notion.

עכשיו, אני ״עובד״ על כסא כרעיון מאידיאה. כוס אמו. זה יתחבר לזה:

By discovering that a cat is everywhere and always a Cat and that it can never and nowhere be anything else, the Greek Philosophers put an end once and for all to these mistakes.

Since this truly revolutionary discovery of the indissoluble link between the Essence of a Thing and the Existence of that same Thing, no sane man (who, by definition, avoids contradicting himself) has ever doubted the fact that there is a one-to-one relationship between a given Essence and a “thingist” Existence.

By linking Essence to Existence with a one-to-one and indissoluble link, the Greeks suppressed the very possibility of Magic as such, based on the negation or non-recognition of such a link.

But they have retained the great discovery of the Magicians of yesteryear, namely the radical distinction between Existence which they called “profane” and which we call “empirical” and Mana (which was “sacred” for them, and which has remained for us, since Plato, “ideal” or “intelligible” and in any case “essential”). In this suppression, the notion of Mana has been transformed or sublimated into that of Essence.

The fact that the Primitives (in the tropics or in Paris) continue even today to admit (explicitly or implicitly) the “magical” conception of the relationship between the Essence and Existence only proves that “cultural” or discursive, even historical, human existence includes “living fossils”, just as does “natural” life, plant or animal.

Psychologically, the concept is no different from “magical” Mana, except that it can only exist in a perfectly determined Thing, while Mana was supposed to be able to find Existence in any “freely chosen” Thing, by its given halo or by a Magician’s hand. The notion of Mana, thus “sublimated” by the Greek Philosophers into the notion of Essence, is the basic notion of all Science in the proper sense of the word.

To want to deny the Greek discovery of the Essence and to return to the magical notion of Mana, would therefore be to want to deny Science as such, in spite of its innumerable technical successes, which is really impossible for someone who is supposed to have a minimum of common sense.

Let us, therefore, admit as an “indisputable” datum, the assertion (of Greek origin) that the Essence of a Thing is necessarily (that is to say everywhere and always) linked to a determined type of “Thingist Existence”. And that all “thingist” Existences of this type always and everywhere (that is to say necessarily) have one and the same Essence.

Henceforth, all cats will in fact have one and the same Essence for us, which is precisely that of the Cat; we will not even try to look for this Essence elsewhere than in a Cat and we will admit that this Essence can only act, for example, by way of catching mice or walking along a gutter, that is, only through an “ordinary living Cat”, being “able to do anything Cats can do, but “essentially” incapable of doing anything else.

However, if we now pass from the Essence of the Cat to the Meaning of the notion CAT, we will see that it is not the same at all. The meaning c a t exists in the cat morpheme in the same way as the Essence of the Cat exists in the living organism. In particular, a CAT qua morpheme can be perceived (heard, seen, etc.) just as can be any cat or any other thing in existence.

But if all the Things which “embody” the Essence of the Cat are everywhere and always Cats, all the morphemes which “embody” the Sense c a t do not necessarily have the form (vocal, graphic, etc.) c a t. If we compare all the morphemes which currently exist on earth and which have (for the one who compares them) one and the same meaning CAT, we will see that they differ from each other much more than a Cat differs from a Dog for example.

However, the difference between a Dog and a Cat is enough for the Essence of the Cat to have a thingistic Existence only in the latter and not in the former. Moreover, what does a vocal morpheme have in common with a graphic or mimic morpheme?

Yet, they can all have one and the same Sense, which exists within each of them. Moreover, we have seen previously that with regard to “content”, there is no difference between the Essence of the Cat and the Sense of the notion c a t.

What radically distinguishes Essence from Sense, therefore, is the fact that Essence is linked to a thingistic Existence of a determined type in a univocal way, while Sense can be linked to any thingistic Existence ( provided it is a Morpheme).

In other words, Sense behaves exactly as “magical” Mana is supposed to behave. One could say that Sense is the “Essence” of the Notion (or of its morpheme), on condition of admitting that this “Essence” has all the characteristics which Mana is supposed to have qua Magic.

ֿWe could therefore say that the Notion is a “magical” or “sacred” entity, while the Thing is a “scientific” or “natural” (even “profane”) entity. Or again, one could say that one and the same “entity” (of which we cannot yet say what it is) can exist as Essence, insofar as it is linked to a “natural Thing”. And at the same time, if not in the same place [the sense is not an Essence, as we will see later], the Psychological Introduction of Concept is scared, insofar as it relates to a “magical Thing”, which is, nothing other than a Morpheme.

It is clear that the recognition of the “essential” difference between Sense and Essence is of capital importance. It is, therefore, necessary to stop there a little, in order to realize its full significance, although this observation seems to us today “trivial” or “banal”, that is to say, if we prefer, “necessarily and universally valid”. וזה על ההבדל בין המובן מהרעיון באין כסא.

זאת הייתה שטות, כן? אבל מחסלת את כל הדיון הפילוסופי של כך וכך שנים. היתי מסביר, אבל הם היו כסא, ועכשיו באו הנעלים. ״אבנה״ כסא.

What is History? E. H. Carr

E. H. Carr. People like to quote this historian’s attitude to facts as saying nothing but what you say them to say, beginning with the choice of what facts to include and how to highlight them thus that they will tell the story you are telling. Indeed, I have made the claim even more relativistic than that which was uttered by this brilliant historian, as, truth to be told, there is nothing dramatic or new about this little reflection, except the fact that the historian is saying it as a critical philosopher, that is, as taking account of himself as speaking it. What is of more interest is this one page following this mumbo jumbo of mine, taken from the Preface of What is History, which goes to explain the optimism with which Carr ends his whole reflection by making a jump to freedom nonetheless the dire times. In short, what is history is the return to philosophy, hinted to us by warning us that Marx would not have approved the talk of mere facts. This is indeed the talk of the facts by the historian speaking as a philosopher or at least as a revolutionary man.

“The tradition of the English-speaking world is profoundly empirical. Facts speak for themselves. A particular issue is debated ‘on its merits’. Themes, episodes, periods are isolated for historical study in the light of some undeclared, and probably unconscious, standard of relevance.

All this would have been anathema to Marx. Marx was no empiricist. To study the part without reference to the whole, the fact without reference to its significance, the event without reference to cause or consequence, the particular crisis without reference to the general situation, would have seemed to Marx a barren exercise.

The difference has its historical roots. Not for nothing has the English-speaking world remained so obstinately empirical. In a firmly established social order, whose credentials nobody wishes to question, empiricism serves to effect running repairs … Of such a world nineteenth-century Britain provided the perfect model.

But in a time when every foundation is challenged, and we flounder from crisis to crisis in the absence of any guidelines, empiricism is not enough”

Kant’s critique of the philosophical discourse

Kant’s critique of the philosophical discourse


As soon as one openly declares that a particular “subject” is specifically philosophical and quite exclusively so, hence, claiming, in fact, that it should be treated by philosophers and solely by philosophers, i.e., philosophically, one finds oneself sooner or later obliged to append or annex all the other sciences to this new field, now, philosophy, thus reducing the “sciences” to silence. But instead of being silent, the advocates of the sciences are vigorously protesting. However, just as soon as the philosophers fancy to silence them by offering them a compromise, throwing at their direction some subjects-matters, which Philosophy has self-willingly chose to relinquish, it becomes quite noticeable that there is no reason to stop the train, and that the sciences should follow this style of a request to the hilt, i.e., to demand scientific independence to all the subjects with the same reason with which philosophy has admitted to justify the abandonment of one of the subjects at the beginning of this process or this later knock-on-effect.


It was by taking advantage of this history lesson that Kant was the first to give up the way of defining Philosophy by its alleged “subject”, by trying to understand it from the way or “method”) in which the philosophers spoke on the “subjects” of which they had spoken; indeed, for Kant, these “subjects” could moreover be arbitrary, when the way is first and its question of application is the very question of their “philosophy”.


It is by proceeding with the courage of despair to such a “Copernican Revolution” of the situation that Kant succeeded in saving Philosophy in extremis, by showing full awareness and giving full account for the “specifically” philosophical behaviour, which he wanted at all costs to maintain in his own philosophy and to ensure for the future. He was able to do this by explicitly giving a fully comprehensible account, and therefore an intelligible definition, of Philosophy, which justified (discursively) “forever” the traditional “universalist” behaviour of philosophers while securing for the first time an “eternal peace” with all the” particular “sciences (and the discourses (Practices), as now promising them, in effect, that no force in the world would henceforth reduce either to Silence or to Philosophy.

The non-philosophers, scientists or not, have ignored and still strong in the habit of overlooking the end-success of the Kantian world revolution, which guaranteed forever, in fact, and for all the philosophers, the universal empire “(and” homogeneous”) of Philosophy.


Thus, even nowadays, the particular sciences believe in occupying little by little the ex-philosophical domain’s, concentrating now on the very last plots. Very recently, “Logistics” believed to annex Logic, while Relative Physics insisted on removing “space and time” from Philosophy. But Kant and the philosophers who understood the Kantian definition of Philosophy and who behaved, philosophically, according to it, regained in a few years all the domains previously lost. To give another example: overcoming the “reserve” that Fichte left to ‘science”, as he was ready to be satisfied with his conquest of Judeo-Christian theology, which he observed vis-à-vis contemporary “science” (of Hellenic origin), Schelling’s work symbolises the reconquest of his predecessors by reintegrating in Philosophy (or, more precisely, in his “philosophy”) all of that which was still existed independent in terms of theoretical speech.


Without a doubt, this untimely campaign of enthusiasts of the Kantian revolution scandalised the world, and the recovery by conquest would certainly have sunk into the anarchy of a general revolt if Hegel had not put the reconquered territory more or less in order, by constituting and ensuring its indivisible unity, in and through this “unsurpassable” system and irreplaceable absolute Knowledge (Natural science (Galileo-Newton’s, that is to say also Hobbes’s) is a pseudoscience > of the working slave. The ex-slave liberated by the revolution (1789) gives it up; his science becomes the philosophy (Hegel’s) based on which man can understand himself as a man (but to that end, the transition through < the stage of > slave labour and its ideology is necessary!). Slave science > leads 1. to transcendentalism, 2. to subjective > idealism. to 3.“phrenology.” that is to say to materialism).

Since then, the universal empire if not of Philosophy, at least of Hegelian discursive Wisdom, has never been called into question again (given the impossibility of doing so, without any response to the question by the System of Knowledge itself which alone allowed it to be asked). Moreover, the “Particular sciences(unlike” practical “discourses) would not have even noticed this empire of the System of Knowledge, if certain” Hegelians had not, here and there and for some time, acted vis-à-vis these sciences, contrary to the armistice that Kant had concluded with them (without them realising it, moreover) and that Hegel could only transform into an eternal peace treaty (but provisionally remained secret).


As for the meaning and the scope of the “miracle of the Marne”, the merit which belongs to Kant alone should be known by now. By stating a fully comprehensive and fully understandable definition of philosophy for the first time, Kant did not modify the latter in any way, nor therefore did he change the (really) philosophical behaviour of (true) philosophers. In fact (and for us post-Kantians), the authentic philosophers behaved after Kant the same way they behaved before him, except that, thanks to his definition of Philosophy, this behaviour became more explicit and more self-consciously.


This “Kantian” take of a complete consciousness allowed Hegel to transform Philosophy into a System of Knowledge (which no one will be able to bring back to Philosophy any longer, given the impossibility of questioning it). It is generally said that Kant’s originality consists in the reduction of Philosophy to a “theory of knowledge” or “Gnoseology”, even to “Epistemology”. Without being false, this paraphrase of the Kantian definition lends itself to misunderstanding: On the one hand, by hearing about Kantian reduction, one does not understand the post-Kantian expansion, which, however, undoubtedly results from it. And by misunderstanding it, we tend to oppose it: “in the name of Kant”, of course. On the other hand, the words “theory” and “-logy” do not sufficiently separate the idea that this could be a “particular” or “isolated” discourse, in a way “independent” from others. In other words, one might believe that it is possible, according to Kant, to develop the “theory” of one “knowledge”, without thereby creating (if only implicitly) “knowledge”, even if one makes a “theory”, even the “knowledge” as such, that is to say, taken as a whole.


Of course, Kant never contradicted himself to the point of saying such a thing. He spoke of Philosophy as a criticism of knowledge, a criticism which implies and presupposes, of course, the whole of the knowledge criticised. On condition of being “critical” (that is to say already criticised or at least open to criticism in the future), all “knowledge” (discursive) is therefore philosophical. However, no (discursive) knowledge escapes philosophical “criticism”.As a “critical” discourse, Philosophy is, therefore indeed, a “universal” discourse (that is to say uni-total) and therefore conforms to the “universalist” behaviour shown by all the philosophers worthy of the name. But insofar as any discourse is not “critical” (at least virtually), it is outside the philosophical discourse aIt speaks and can remain there in peace as long as it wishes. In other words, the particular sciences” (by definition not philosophical) can appropriate and share all the discourses (coherent or not) insofar as they are not “criticised”; but each of these discourses is transformed into a philosophical course or, more exactly, into a constitutive or integrating element of the Philosophical Discourse (coherent, that is, completed System of Knowledge), as soon as it is criticised or put to its “criticism” (by philosophical definition) and thus makes one with it.


Briefly and clearly, Philosophy has been understood since Kant as the (coherent) set of (coherent) discourses which speak of everything (or anything) while also speaking of itself. We can also say that any “science” is philosophical, which speaks about what it speaks about and because it speaks about it and that it is the one person who is speaking about it. Conversely, any discourse which does not speak of itself (as of discourse) is therefore outside Philosophy and can therefore live indefinitely in peace with it by ignoring it completely.


So, for example, when a mathematician is no longer content to “do mathematics”, but begins to talk about what he does while doing it, he (discursively) develops what he nowadays calls a “meta-mathematics “, that is to say what was called” metaphysics “in the good old days and what the Neo-Kantians in the narrow sense of the term prefer to call this critical philosophy (of mathematics)” (sometimes forgetting that one cannot “criticise” mathematics by “disregarding it”, that is to say by excluding it, even as implicit, from the “philosophical” discourse which they would like to develop). Likewise, a physicist does physics when he says, for example, that everything he talks about must be reduced to (measurable) interactions between “electrons”, neutrons “, protons” or other entities of the same kind, but excludes from what he talks about everything he says about it himself; but as soon as he includes it, by saying that what he says must also be reduced to the interactions of which he speaks, he speaks no longer as a physicist, but as a philosopher, who integrates a (could be good) physics in a (really bad) “philosophy” (called “materialist”, which moreover eliminates itself from the System of Knowledge, since it reduces itself to silence by counter-saying it). Or again, when a theologian develops the bare tale of a “revelation” or talks about how it was given (in general and to him in particular), he makes theology. If he explains himself as speaking through revelation, then he is doing philosophy to the extent.


In short, the “philosophical sciences” are the only “Sciences” which speak for themselves, while also speaking of what they say about them, and it is precise to the extent that they do so that they are not Sciences proper (“particular” and “Exclusive”, since each of them excludes all the others and, in any case, leaves it to others to speak of itself as speaking of itself), but the same Philosophy (developable, at the limit, in one and unique Knowledge System). Therefore, we can also say that only the philosophers speak of Philosophy and speak only of it. But we must add that they can only talk about it by speaking (at least implicitly) of everything that we can say (without contradicting each other) and that they must therefore re-say it in its entirety, if not at all. to do so only in an implicit way (the complete clarification of all the implications of their philosophical discourses transforming them into this unique discourse and one that is the Hegelian System of Knowledge

%d בלוגרים אהבו את זה: