כמו נגיד את כל האונוטולוגיה ההגליאנית במשפט- אם מרחביות היא ההוויה עצמה, הזמניות היא השונות בין הוויה לאין (שונות זו אינו אלא ה”זהות” שלהם כ”תנועה” או כ”התהוות״ של ההוויה). או, במילים אחרות, אם להשתמש בטרמינולוגיה שנקבעה קודם לכן, הוויה (מרחבית) היא הקיום של הוויה נתונה או של הוויה-שונה-מהאין, בעוד שהשוני (הזמני או “בזמן”) בין הוויה (כשם שהיא “נבראת” או “מושמדת”) לבין האין הוא המהות של אותה הוויה נתונה – אז אולי אני אנסה פילוסופיה בטוויטר?
Damascius’ Philosophical Moment
Damascius, and the silencing of Proclus, through the attack on Proclus’ trick. (Try to follow if you are inclined to philosophy, and if only for the joy of detecting a philosophical, dialectical genius).
The silencing by Proclus of the whole pagan Philosophy was perfectly understood by Damascius, who thus put an end to the development of this Philosophy. Proclus’ trick consists in appealing to an ineffable Beyond each time he finds himself obliged to contradict what he says by speaking (in the Here Below) of the Here Below. If it is impossible to do this by speaking of Something, as when speaking EITHER of A only, OR Not-a only, so that one is obliged to say “both” AND A AND Not-a, it does no harm there (here), since there is something else “outside” of the Something, this Other-thing being NEITHER A, NOR Non-a. If the Discourse which reveals a Something which is AND A AND Not-a, contradicts itself by saying it (actually, this discourse is a contradiction in terms, by definition, moreover) and is thereby reduced to silence, this Silence reveals an Other-thing which is ineffable precisely because it is NEITHER A, NOR Not-a. In other words, the Other-thing is nothing of what the Something is, and it is in this that its transcendence consists: the transcendent Other-thing is not Something.
/ To which Damascius replies that, in this case, the Other-thing is nothing at all, which means that there is no Transcendence. Damascius’ (atheistic) critique of the (theistic) notion of Transcendence takes place in two stages.
/ 1 / He begins by showing that the process of “transcendentalization” is, though transcendent by definition, infinite in the sense of in-definite. Indeed, if the contradiction between A and Not-a obliges us to postulate a Something which is neither A nor Not-a and which is thus the “relation” to all that is either A or Not-a, the Discourse, taken as a whole, must speak “at the same time” AND of what is (A and Not-a) AND of what is not (neither A nor Not-a), so that the whole of the Discourse is again contradictory. The principle of transcendentalization therefore demands that we go beyond this new AND-AND by a new NOR-NOR: beyond the Something which is not only A and Not-a, but which is still neither A nor No-a, there is an Other-thing, which is neither one (A and Not-a) nor the other (neither A nor Not-a). Now, already the first Transcendent was absolutely unique and one, since all distinction was excluded from it; and it was therefore absolutely ineffable. The method of transcendentalization therefore obliges us to posit beyond the first unique transcendent, a second Transcendent, unique and one as well: we thus obtain an ineffable Beyond which is situated beyond the Beyond and which is revealed in and by a Silence which is beyond Silence. [[[More particularly, i.e., philosophically: [Proclus himself is content to admit that if one “ascends” in a continuous way (discursively) from C to B (passing through a and b), one must make a “leap” to a go up from B to A: he “ignores a the starting point A’ in the Ascent. It was Damascius who reminded him of this, by showing that the eternal (-spatial) coexistence of the Proodos and the Epistrophe results in a coincidence of A with A’, that is to say, of the Theos with the Hyle. But by substituting Matter (A’) for God (A) [as Damascius seems to want to do] we admit (implicitly) that the circle C is not discursive and therefore that the alleged notion B is at most only a Paranotion (or a Sign: a spelling or a :proper name”), even a Pseudo-motion (or a Symbol, “mystical” or mathematical) – Moreover, from the fact that what is outside of C is both A and A’ (since the Proodos is supposed to be co-eternal (with the Epistrophe), Damascius concludes that A = A’ (and not that A’ = A): for him, what corresponds to Speech is Matter only so that the Speech can relate only to Matter, unless one admits that there is outside the Something which is AND A AND A’ an Other thing which is NOR A NOR A’, which, for Damascius, would be the the height of absurdity, since it would be a question (A being God and A’ Matter Nothingness, the two Ineffable silent and Silence ineffable) of a God who would be “above” God, or of a Matter which is “below” Matter ( = Nothingness), even of an “Ineffable” which would be outside the Ineffable or of a “Silence” which would be beyond Silence]]].
/ / 2 Be that as it may, it is obvious that once set in motion, the process of transcendentalization can no longer be stopped; as long as we admit a single ineffable Transcendent, we can admit as many as we like. Now, it is here that the second stage of the critique of transcendentalization by Damascius begins. From the moment that transcendentalization is in-definite, the Transcendent is not the unique, finite and de-finite One, but the In-finite without goal or term, devoid of any structure. Besides, if all Transcendents are ineffable, there is no way to distinguish them from each other, since all silences are equal. Now, the contra-dictory Discourse is equivalent to Silence: to say of Something that it is A and Not-a at the same time amounts to saying nothing at all about it, namely neither that it is A nor that it is is Not-a. Thus, the NOR-NOR that is Theos is equivalent to the AND-AND that is Hylé. But, since the ineffable Transcendent is in-finite in the sense of in-definite, it is better to call it not God, but “Matter”. Damascius himself seems to have deduced from this reasoning a kind of materialist Atheism, even of atheistic Materialism, given that “Discursive Materialism” is by definition incapable of deducing the Discourse that it is itself [[[[Damascius claims that if A ( = Eleatic Hen) being already “divine”, ineffable and silent, B must be beyond the divine silent Ineffable and A “beyond” this already hyper-transcendent B. Hence Damascius concludes that as soon as one admits an (ineffable) Transcendent, one cannot stop superimposing other hyper-transcendents upon it. Whence the need to substitute for the transcendent Ineffable ( = God) an immanent Ineffable ( = Matter), which is equally in-definite or open to infinite regression. But Damascius may have seen that this “regression” is in fact nothing more than an “infinite mathematical progression” (in the final analysis: the indefinite series of positive and negative integers). The immanence of the Ineffable (“material”) would then signify the possibility of a mathematical Physics (replacing Energo-logy, while Mathematics replaces Onto-logy). If this were so, Damascius would renounce Philosophy, even the System of Knowledge, in favor of Mathematics and Physics (the Phenomenology being replaced by a Phenomenometric, that is to say, by the “exact” natural sciences). In other words, the contradiction between Platonism and Aristotelianism would reduce to silence the whole of Discourse degenerating into a set of (mathematical) Symbols, which would relate to the whole of “Matter” which corresponds to it [what actually happened, moreover, in the sixteenth century for the whole of pagan philosophy (insofar as it was not transformed into Christian philosophy)]]]
/ By silencing Proclus, Damascius believed he had silenced (desperate, moreover) all human discourse and therefore Philosophy as such. But, in fact and for us, Damascius had only reduced to silence, even to Contradiction, Pagan Philosophy, which, by deliberately excluding (Spatio-)temporality, deliberately ignored anthropogenic Negativity. For us, the Pagan Theos was in fact Hylé because it was not Negativity or Totality, but Pure Identity, by definition ineffable and mute.
The Dialectic of Discourse (1)Hypothesis, Thesis, Anti-Thesis…Syn-Thesis
In order to be able to speak OF ANY discourse [having a meaning] or, what is the same thing, Of Discourse (Logos) as such, we must begin by positing a discourse [ endowed with any meaning] whatever it may be. Because putting it down ourselves is so easy that it would make no sense to wait for it to be given to us, for example by falling from the sky, or elsewhere. But to do so, we will only ask ourselves if we actually have the (conscious and voluntary) intention to do so. That is to say that before positing it, we must presuppose it (as a discourse endowed with any meaning, not yet effectively posited, but as in front of and able to be posited by us, later). In other words, we must begin by ascertaining within ourselves the intention to speak (as well as the “will,” moreover optional or “free,” to actually do so). Or, to put it still another way, let us say that at the beginning (in an arch) the Discourse (Logos) is [for all those for whom discourse has a meaning] not a position (thesis), but a sup-position or, for say it in Greek, a
The Hypo-thesis being the intention to speak in order to say anything which nevertheless makes sense, it suffices for us to act in accordance with this intention by saying anything whatsoever (which we can, of course, refrain from indefinitely, on the condition that we do not account for our voluntary silence in and through discourse, “justifying” or otherwise), to effectively posit the Discourse as any discourse whatsoever. Now, if we do so, the discourse thus posited by us will presuppose, for us, nothing other or more than the Hypothesis, which was precisely the intention of positing the discourse in question. In other words, this discourse can be posited without having been preceded by another effective discourse, although it can only be posited in the present by supposing in the past the intention (conscious and voluntary ) to do so. We can also say that the first discourse actually emitted arises, for us, in the present, by supposing in the past a “virtual” discourse (whose “power” it “actualises”), which pre-supposes it. -supposes to be put into action” in the future. This being so, we can say that the first (actual) discourse which is posited, without sup-posing (in and by its presence in the present) any (actual) discourse emitted in the past, which would presuppose it itself, and without pre-supposing (in the same present of its presence) another discourse (actual or virtual) which would be emitted in the future by sup-posing it- this being so, we can say that this first discourse is a pure and simple position (of the Discourse as such) or, to continue speaking Greek, that this discourse “first a is a
However! If, after having occupied this first discursive position and having rested there as much as we please, we re-pose the thetic discourse in question, in order to say anything about it, we will find that by understanding its meaning whatever it is, we necessarily understand, by this very meaning, the meaning of a virtual discourse, which we could take as its “contrary” or its “negation”. And by speaking about this observation as much as necessary, we will end by saying that if, by impossibility, the “negative” or “contrary” discourse had no meaning, the “positive” or thetic discourse would also not have meaning of its own; and therefore would not be effectively posited as Discourse (by definition endowed with meaning), despite the hypo-thesis, which was the intention to speak and even an intention that we had had the feeling of having achieved. In other words, if the thetic discourse posited in the first place actually has any meaning S, Non-S is also a discursive meaning, which can consequently be that of an effective discourse so-called, having a meaning contrary to that of the thetic discourse. We. we must therefore say that the positive discourse, posited as a thesis, in fact presupposed, at the very moment of its positing, “the negative discourse” which one could call “contrary thesis”; -by presupposing this discourse if not as effective, at least as virtual or as being able to be actualised after the first “actualised” thesis, and in any case as supposing the actuality of the latter in a present which will have become past when its future will be present in the act of the second thesis “or contrary”. However! If we say all this now, we must add that at the time when it was actualised, the Thesis itself did not say it. But if, assuming the past actuality of this Thesis, we actualise in the present its discursive negation, which is the contrary “thesis”, we can and must say that this supposes the first “Thesis” as already actualised in the past. And as presupposing (in fact, if not for itself), if only as virtual, the contrary “thesis” as to be actualised in a present which was yet to come when the first Thesis was the only discourse present. Or even, to put it in a perhaps simpler way: if one can emit a Thesis (by positive definition) without speaking of the contrary Thesis, which is its negation, it is rigorously impossible to discursively deny a Thesis without explicitly mentioning it. Because if it is very easy to occupy any position that no one occupies and to lose interest in other positions occupied or not, one can occupy a position by dislodging someone only by knowing in advance where this position is or, at least, by noting it at the very moment of its occupation. When you don’t take a stand against anyone, you can very well imagine being alone in the world. But who (even if his name is Don Quixote) would want to take any position against someone he says (believing) doesn’t even exist? Be that as it may, we will say that any posited discourse provokes (sooner or later) an op-posed discourse, which means that any discursive position is opposed (actually or virtually) to an op-posed discursive position or counter-position, even to speak Greek again, to an
The Anti-thesis, which opposes the Thesis, sup-poses the latter as posited or as pre-supposing it while being posited (certainly, in the second time, that is, by the anti-thesis). If, taken and understood in itself or in its isolation (that is to say in its only connection with the Hypo-thesis), the Thesis itself does not posit and does not even pre-suppose the Anti-thesis, it nevertheless presupposes it insofar as it is itself sup-posed by the latter. Now, since the Thesis is actualised before the Anti-thesis, the latter presupposes the Thesis as already actualised or posed. The Anti-thesis can therefore only be actualised (in the present) by also actualising the Thesis, as sup-posed by it and pre-supposing it. In other words, the Anti-thesis re-poses the Thesis which, by thus re-posing itself, pre-supposes the Anti-thesis which sup-poses it. Thus, the “first” or “isolated” Thesis, which is only posed, but not yet re-posed, is sup-posed by the Anti-thesis as past. But the same thesis, as re-posited in and by the Anti-thesis as pre-supposing it, is presupposed by the latter as present, that is to say as actual in the present of the actuality of the Anti-thesis itself. In other words, if the Anti-thesis can only posit itself by opposing the Thesis, it actualises, by positing itself in the present, not only itself, but also the thesis that it re-establishes. -pose by sup- posing.
Thus, if the presence of the Thesis can be isolated or soltary, that of the Anti-thesis is necessarily, that is to say, everywhere and always, a co-presence with the thesis to which it opposes. As soon as there is the Anti-thesis, there is therefore not a single discourse (endowed with meaning), but two: Anti- thesis itself, and the Thesis that it must suppose and therefore re-pose in order to be able to oppose it in action. But, for us, these two speeches are one. Indeed, if the Anti-thesis and the Thesis can isolate themselves from the Hypo-thesis (by “forgetting it”), we must consider them both as “conforming” to the latter, even as “resulting” (discursively) from it, that is, by way of “deduction” or “inference”). The Anti-thesis can (and even must) negate the Thesis as a discourse properly speaking, that is to say, as a discourse endowed with a meaning that is by definition “coherent”. It can say that the “thesis” that it re-poses in order to oppose it is a “contradiction in terms” and that it is thus equivalent to a silence (with sound or not), devoid as such of any kind of meaning, which can only be discursive, and that any true meaning can only be “common” (even “compatible”) with the meaning of “antithetical” discourse. And the re-posited Thesis can also say as much about the antithesis that it presupposes in order to oppose it in turn. But we cannot forget the Hypo-thesis without which neither Thesis nor Anti-thesis could emerge. Now, this Hypo-thesis was the intention to say anything that made any sense. We therefore have no reason to prefer the Thesis to the Antithesis or vice versa, nor to eliminate one for the sole benefit of the other. Moreover, if the Anti-thesis were, by impossibility, right to say that the Thesis has no meaning (or, what is the same thing, that it is a pseudo-discourse which contradicts itself and therefore discursively cancels everything he says), it would lose its right to say that it itself has a meaning. For if S had no meaning, the Non-S would have even less. But, conversely, the negation of S can only be absolutely devoid of any kind of meaning if S itself had none.
Therefore, we must say, without any hesitation, that the Thesis and the Anti-thesis have one and the same reason to claim the Hypothesis. In other words, it is neither one nor the other, understood and taken in isolation, but only the two taken and understood together, which completely actualise the intention to speak in order to say anything ( sensible dex”), which was their common “hypothesis”. However! Having no (discursive) reason to prefer one of the two contrary theses to the other and therefore being unable to forget either of them completely for the exclusive benefit of the other. We can therefore speak of them validly only by restating them as a single discourse, the meaning of which can only be one. But this one and unique meaning will be “at the same time”” (that is to say, in the present where the unique discourse which re-poses the Thesis and the Anti-thesis will be present) S and No-S. Now, obviously and by definition, S has nothing in common with Not-S, so that the discourse in question will have no common sense and, consequently, no sense at all. Indeed, in this “synthetic” discourse, what will be said in the “antithetical” part whose meaning is Not-S, will contradict everything that had been said in the “thetic” part, which the “anti-thetic” part supposes. Thus the so-called “synthetic” discourse will be equivalent, at least for us, to any kind of silence, by definition devoid of any discursive meaning whatsoever. In other words, we will not be able to assign to this pseudo-discourse (yet “synthetic” or “total” in the sense that it re-unites all the “parts” of any discourse) any position in the ” Universe of discourse”. Neither that of the Thesis, nor that of the Anti-thesis; because we cannot place the Whole (by definition de-finite or “finite”) in one of these parts. Nor in any other position whatsoever, since the Whole cannot be situated elsewhere than in the set of its parts. Thus, the pseudo-discourse that has presented itself to us will not be placed in any of the possible discursive positions: it will necessarily be situated, that is to say, everywhere and always, alongside or outside of all these positions. . And we can say it in Greek (Stoic, moreover), by saying that this “third” discourse, also uttered in accordance with the one and unique discursive Hypothesis, is a
It’d be tried on another occasion.
AFTER IT, WE HAVE THE SYN-THESIS
One can begin a discursive development from S only by re-beginning that which leads to S and ends there (unless it rebegins). This shows that when one has stopped speaking after having completely developed the Syn-thesis, one has hypothetically said all that one can say without repeating oneself, following through on the intention to speak/to say anything whatever (meaningful). Thus, on the one hand, the discursive actualisation of the Syn-thesis does not prevent one from continuing to speak, since one can indefinitely re-say what one has said by actualising it. On the other hand, since this same actualisation obliges either to say nothing more, or to re-say what one has said, it is indeed an actualisation of everything that one can say in the proper sense of the word, that is, without contradicting oneself by denying everything one has said and thus reducing oneself to silence.
However, there are two (discursive) reasons why this is so. On the one hand, the Syn-thesis says all that can be said because it re-says not only what the Thesis had said at the beginning, but also what the Anti-thesis said later in contradicting this. Now, by denying everything that the Thesis affirms (explicitly or implicitly), the Anti-thesis affirms everything that this Thesis denies: not explicitly, it is true, since it denies nothing in actuality, but implicitly or in Potentia. Thus, insofar as the Thesis says something (by explicitly affirming it), the Anti-thesis says (explicitly, by affirming it) all that the latter does not say (thus implicitly denying it). Consequently, the Syn-thesis, which re-says what the Thesis and the Anti-thesis say, effectively says everything that can be said. And this is in accordance with the “Principle of excluded middle”, which says that if you want to say anything of anything, you must say either S (this S being any meaning whatsoever), or Not-S . Whence it follows that nothing else can be said of them, so that having said both, one can no longer say anything at all. Which would be true, a curious thing, even if we were ready, in order to be able to say something else, to say what contradicts itself. On the contrary, it is only because of this truly universal “principle” that one can contradict oneself (when one says something), even when one does not want to. On the other hand, if by re-saying what the Thesis and the Anti-thesis say, the Syn-thesis says all that one can say, it can say it (by re-saying the two contrary theses”) in the strong sense, that is to say without finally annulling the discourse by the fact of contradicting at the end all that was said there at the beginning.
But this is only possible because the Discourse develops in time. Indeed, a “Principle of Identity” rightly tells us that if there can be a sense in saying anything about anything, the anything that is said thus has no meaning only if we say it about what we are talking about and not about something else. What remains true even if the meaning is a “misinterpretation”, or even a “suppressed” meaning (in the sense of annulled). By saying nonsense (of meaning) about something (whatever this something), one says (implicitly) that what one speaks about is what one said insofar as one says it. What one makes explicit by saying that the something one speaks of can only “correspond” to what one says of it insofar as what one speaks of remains just as “identical to itself” (it is that is to say remains one and the same thing) “identical to itself” (that is to say is the same) as the meaning of what is said about it.
Now, this indefinite maintenance in identity with itself/oneself both of everything one says and of everything one speaks about (in so far as one speaks about it), generally incites those who speak to forget that these two identities, each one in itself, and!, are, in fact, not only an instantaneous presence in the spatial expanse, but also a temporal duration. Otherwise, one could deduce from the “Principle of [supposedly ‘eternal’ or ‘timeless’, i.e. purely spatial] identity”, taken [rightly] as a presupposition necessary to the “Principle of the excluded middle” [which says quite rightly that what would be neither S, nor Non-S, cannot be said not only nowhere, but still never], a “Principle of contradiction” which would affirm [ wrongly] that nothing can be S and Not-S (whatever S), so that to say the two of anything would be to say nothing at all and would thus be equivalent to that silence to which all discourse is reduced which would have been deprived of all its meaning (by cancelling each of its meanings by an “opposite” meaning).
It is moreover by “spatializing” the discourse and by reducing everything that is spoken of in it to a single extent, that the Thesis and the Antithesis constitute as a whole the Para-thesis which, by developing completely, cancels itself as meaningful speech, contradicting itself everything it says. The Para-thesis is finally reduced to silence (in accordance with the “Principle of contradiction”) by trying to pose in the only extension (that is to say simultaneously, for lack of being able to do it outside of duration or in the ” eternity”) the meaning of the Thesis and that of the Anti-thesis; and it remains forever silent (in accordance with the “Principle of the excluded middle”), for lack of being able to pose anywhere and anytime a meaning that would be other than those of the Thesis or the Anti-thesis. Which means that it would be absolutely impossible to say anything (with meaning, or even with “sense”) if you had no time to do so. And the fact is that any discourse whatsoever has everywhere and always, that is to say necessarily, a certain duration (which is, moreover, a certain duration, in the sense of being measurable). Now, very fortunately for the Discourse, we have plenty of time to update it. And having a certain time, we can actualise it as Syn-thesis.
Provided that the formula of the “Principle of contradiction” is amended in such a way as to take account of the fact that it takes time to say anything (meaningful) and that, consequently, one can only speak of what is also in time, even if it means lasting there in such a way as to remain identical to itself (at least insofar as one speaks of it) as long as the meaning of what one says “is”. It will then be necessary (what is commonly said, without, however, always drawing all the consequences) that nothing can be such that there is a meaning in saying (without contradicting itself) that this is S and Not-S “is” at the same time. On the other hand, we never contradict ourselves anywhere (and we even sometimes say very sensible things) by saying, in the Present, that what was only S in the Past, will now only be Non-S in the future. If you have any doubts, let’s get back to coffee. Instead of saying to the boy like the other time: “Bring me beer, but don’t bring it to me”, I will say to him this time: “Bring me beer, but don’t bring it to me before half an hour”. And you will see that he will be very surprised (perhaps even furious, if he [wrongly] perceives a touch of irony on my part), but will not consider me crazy in any way and will (probably) bring the beer (maybe even “immediately”). Now, if we agree on this point, everything else flows from the source.
If the Syn-thesis says everything that can be said (without contradicting itself), this is done neither by the Thesis nor by the Anti-thesis. Because the Thesis does not say what the Anti-thesis says and the latter only re-says what the former says by contradicting it. As for the Para-thesis, it only claims to say everything, but in fact it does not do so, since, taken and understood as a whole, it says nothing at all. Thus, if one wanted to stop at the Para-thesis, all the discourse uttered until then would be reduced to silence and the intention of speaking about the Hypo-thesis would not be realised and could never be realised. By closing the discursive circuit by returning to the Hypo-thesis from the Para-thesis, one obtains a circuit that is too short, which is in fact only a short-circuit. Instead of actualising the Hypothesis, we would have its total cancellation; instead of a discursive development, there would be a permanent silence. And there would be nothing surprising there, since one can speak only in Time and since Time is introduced into Discourse only in and by Syn-thesis (although Discourse itself is always done in time, which allows it to last and only to be cancelled as meaning after the Para-thesis was developed for a long time, in opposites).
In other words, only the Syn-thesis completely realises the “primordial” intention of speaking or, in other words, perfectly actualises the Hypothesis of the Discourse whatever it is or as such. Indeed, the Thesis does not by itself exhaust the discursive possibilities, since, by not saying itself what the Anti-thesis will say, it does not say everything that can be said. Moreover, the Thesis virtually surpasses its own “thesis”, since the latter will provoke (sooner or later, but necessarily, that is to say everywhere and always) the “contrary thesis” which is the Anti -thesis. For if it didn’t, what it said didn’t have a meaning that could be denied (in a discursive or sensible way), which means that it wouldn’t have any meaning at all and therefore wouldn’t be real speech. (“consistent with the hypothesis”). But, by actualizing itself, the Anti-thesis provoked by the Thesis does not actualise by itself either the totality of the Discourse that is “in potency” qua Hypo-thesis. For by saying everything that the Thesis does not say, it re-says what the Thesis said only to contradict it or deny it, that is to say, to annul it as a discourse endowed with meaning [which it does by affirming, moreover wrongly, that which the thetic discourse said itself in the final analysis]. Moreover, the whole of the virtual Discourse that is the Hypothesis can only be actualized completely or perfectly in and by the whole of the thetic and antithetical discourses. It is this integral or integrating actualisation that begins as Para-thesis. But it fails in coming to an end, because the whole of the para-thetic discursive development effectively contradicts itself and therefore annuls its own meaning, so that the completed Para-thesis is no longer a discourse at all (not even in power). Now, we have seen that the attempt at integration or para-thetic synthesis fails because the Para-thesis, while developing itself discursively and therefore, in fact, in the extended duration of the Universe [which allows it to cancel itself out, by contradicting itself, only after a certain time, more or less long, moreover], speaks only of what, for it, extends without really lasting [being “instantaneous” or “eternal”, that is to say, situated in a stationary “instant” even spatialized (nunc stans)], or of what co-exists only, without ever preceding nor following itself anywhere. This is how the Para-thesis speaks of Thesis and Anti-thesis. And this is why, by trying to say everything “at the same time” (that is to say, at the same time), (( the Para-thesis ends by noting what it cannot say: neither what the Thesis had said, nor what the Anti-thesis said while contradicting it. Now, the Syn-thesis succeeds precisely where the Para-thesis fails. It re-says what the Thesis and the Anti-thesis had said, and it can do so without what one of the two said contradicting or discursively cancelling everything that the other had said, because it re-says the one after the other, taking into account and rendering the account discursively, by repeating them both, not without the deep “meaning” involved in the fact that the one is posterior to the other. It thus says effectively (without contradicting itself) not only all that the Anti-thesis said by contradicting all that the Thesis had said, but also all that the latter said at a time when nothing yet contradicted it. And that is why it says, while re-saying it, all that one can say without contradicting oneself, thus actualising in and by one and the same discourse which is its own, the totality of the Potential Discourse which it presupposes as a Hypothesis, or as an intention to speak in order to say anything and therefore everything that has any common sense (as meaning).
If the actualisation of the Hypo-thesis by the Thesis, the Anti-thesis and the Para-thesis introduces the Discourse into the extended duration of the Universe, it is the Syn-thesis alone which introduces this extended duration into the Discourse, insofar as the latter is actualised as this synthetic, integral or uni-total discourse that it is itself as long as it lasts and extends. It is by this “temporalisation” of the meaning of the discourse that it is itself (and which is “temporal”, as are all discourses whatever they may be) that the Syn-thesis differs essentially from the Thesis, the Antithesis and the Para-thesis. It is maintaining itself as discourse not only “for a time” (that is, during the time that a discourse is not contradicted, neither by itself nor by another discourse), but all the time that it has been, is and will be what it is, that is to say, discourse endowed with a meaning that does not contradict itself (neither by itself, nor by a counter-sense-saying). By saying (explicitly) that everything one speaks of (without contradicting oneself) is S and S only (which means, implicitly, that one cannot speak of anything as a Not-S), the Thesis, which in fact says it in a hic et nunc of the extended duration of the Universe or of the World-where-one-speaks, does not itself bind to this hic et nunc, in its own discourse, nor this speech itself, nor the meaning of what is said there. It is the same for the Anti-thesis when it says (explicitly) that, nothing of what one speaks (without contradicting oneself) being able to be S, one can say nothing, except that everything is No -S. Because in saying it, one could neither say what should not be said, nor when one said what one should. (???) Now, if neither the Thesis nor the Anti-thesis situate themselves, in the extended duration in which they are actualized (in different hic et nunc) as discourse, neither what they speak of, nor what they say about it (by contradicting one another), the Para-thesis does not do so either when it speaks of what it had said, and it does not situate itself either. -even in the extended duration in which it is actualised (in a hic et nunc distinct from the preceding ones), neither as such, nor in relation to the Thesis and the Anti-thesis of which it speaks. The Para-thesis therefore results in the Silence of the contra-diction because it can neither situate the Thesis (or the meaning of what it says) before or after the Anti-thesis (or the meaning of what it says), nor situating itself after or before them. And this is how it is inevitably led to mean all “at the same time” [and not even “at the same time”, to tell the truth, since what has neither “before” nor “after is not in “time”, nor therefore in the “present”, unless it is a question of the so-called “present” of a so-called “eternal presence”], which forces, in the end, to say nothing at all [after having vainly, but for a long time, tried to say “partially” anything].
Quite different, on the other hand, is synthetic discourse. On the one hand, the Syn-thesis situates itself, in the extended duration of the Universe where it is actualised, after the Para-thesis which, for it, is preceded by the Anti-thesis, which precedes the thesis. And the Syn-thesis thus situates itself, in the extended duration where the hic et nunc of its own discursive actualisation is situated, not only as the effective discourse that it is, but also as the meaning of this discourse. In other words, the Syn-thesis is not only, like all discourses whatever they may be, a temporal discourse, but also a “temporalised” discourse. When the Syn-thesis begins its discursive development (that is, its actualisation), it re-says everything that the Thesis had said without modifying or adding anything to it; -except the assertion that what it re-says (as Syn-thesis) has been said (by the Thesis), as not contradicted (by the Anti-thesis), only in and for the past. Having said all this, the Syn-thesis continues its development by restating all that the Anti-thesis had said, without modifying it and adding only the assertion that it is only in and for the Present of its actuality that the Anti-thesis contradicted everything that the Thesis had previously said and affirmed, therefore, becoming the opposite of everything that the latter said. Now, by the very fact that the Syn-thesis says so, everything that the Para-thesis said before it becomes “without-objects, since the latter spoke only of the (spatial) co-existence of the Thesis and of the Anti-thesis, disregarding the fact of their (temporal) succession. The Syn-thesis might not re-say the Para-thesis at all, since the latter itself says nothing at all, having previously reduced itself to silence, by not re-saying either what the Anti-thesis said before it, nor what the Thesis had said before it, only contradicting everything that it itself had said. In other words, in synthetic repetition, the Para-thesis (which has reduced itself to silence by contradicting itself) could be present only in and by what the Synthesis does not say (and this which cannot be said without contradicting itself). But the Syn-thesis could just as well re-say everything that the Para-thesis had said, without contradicting itself for all that, since it would re-say the para-thetical sayings by temporising them, that is to say, by situating them, in relation to synthetic discourse, in a past which was a future for the Antithesis which contradicted the Thesis which had preceded it in time. As for the Syn-thesis itself, it completes its own discursive development or is completely actualised as such, by adding to what it has re-said that everything it says is said in its present for any future: because what it says here and now can never be contradicted anywhere, since it does not contradict anything itself and it not only re-says everything that has been said (in the past) as being able to be contradicted (in a present yet to come), but still everything that was said (in a present already past) by contradicting it (as co-present) . The temporalisation” of the Discourse aside, the Syn-thesis only re-says what the Anti-thesis said “in its time”, which itself re-says the Thesis by contradicting it (the two thus saying together all that one can say). The Syn-thesis is therefore nothing other, nor more, but nothing less either, than the “temporalised” Anti-thesis, that is to say, the Anti-Thesis being situated in a Present (of the extended duration of the Universe) which is also the Future, because in relation to it (as well as in and for itself) the Thesis is only the Past.
This is how the Syn-thesis differs not only from the Thesis, since it re-says what the Anti-thesis had said and what the Thesis did not say, but also from the Anti-thesis, since in re-saying it, it no longer contradicts what the Thesis said as the Anti-thesis had done (but only re-says it, like a “past thesis”). And it differs finally from the Para-thesis, because the latter did not manage to re-say, neither what the Anti-thesis said, nor what the Thesis had said, while the Syn-thesis re-says itself (successively) what one and the other said. The Syn-thesis re-says everything that the authentic Thesis said, that is to say, the discourse that said everything that was not (yet) contradicted; but it re-says it as no longer being contradicted, because it has already passed. And it re-says everything that the authentic Anti-thesis said; but it re-says it without contradicting anything, because at the moment it re-says it, everything that could be contradicted by re-saying the Antithesis, is no longer said at all, having only been said in the past. In short, the Syn-thesis is the future of the Anti-thesis which is present without any Thesis other than that of a definitive past. Thus, the Syn-thesis cancels the Thesis and the Anti-thesis as co-present; but it preserves the Thesis as past and sublimates it as negated by the Anti-thesis, which is also annulled as contradicting the Thesis, but preserved in what it presently affirms and sublimated, insofar as it is henceforth alone to say it, without contradicting anything, nor being itself contradicted. And it is as annulled, preserved and sublimated by “temporalization” (even “dialectically suppressed: aufgehoben) that Thesis and Anti-thesis indefinitely maintain their discursive presence in the Present of the extended duration of the Universe where they are actualised; and this as one and the same Syn-thesis, which is the fully developed Discourse or the fully actualised Hypo-thesis.
In short, the Discourse in potency (that is to say, the Intention-to-speak, sup-posed discursively as a Hypothesis) is actualised during an effective discursive process, which lasts and extending. This process begins with the actualization of the thetic discourse, which says that everything (what we talk about) is S (whatever this S) and that nothing (what we talk about) is Not-S. For a time, no speech contradicts what this first speech says. Then comes a moment when a second discourse is actualised, which is antithetical because it contradicts everything that was said by the first: it says that nothing (of what we speak) is S and that, consequently, everything (what we talk about) is Non-S. The co-existence or co-presence of these two contrary discourses in the Present relegates to the Past the solitary presence or existence of the Thesis, while the possible presence of the Anti-thesis only is still situated in the Past. In the course of their co-presence, the contrary theses discursively cancel each other out. Thus, taken and understood as a whole, the discourses actualised until now are reduced to the purely virtual Discourse of the discursive origin: everything that is said, in the Present, by contradicting itself, is only hypothetical, and the Discourse as such de-actualises itself to re-become the virtual or potential Discourse that is the discursive Hypo-thesis or the Intention-to-speak. If this discursive-Intention or this Discourse-to-come is also actualised in the extended-duration, it CAN be presented as a re-telling of the Thesis (assuming that whoever will re-present it in the Present [with a view to the Future] will be able to completely forget the Past, which also implied what was to come when the Thesis it now re-presents presented itself for the first time). In this case, the discursive process is re-produced as it is; and it CAN re-occur in this way “indefinitely”. The Discourse as such will then remain everywhere and always hypothetical, we will speak “endlessly” according to the discursive-Intention, that is to say, the desire to say something; but, in fact, nothing will be said. For the Discourse never being finished, its meaning will always remain in-definite or not “definite”. This discourse will be constantly actualised in a present to come or already past, but it will never be in action in the present. A day MAY come, however, when the Hypo-thesis will be actualised not by a thetic discourse which does not yet deny anything, nor by an antithetical discourse which affirms only to contradict, nor even by para-thetics discourses, where all the contrary theses mutually contradict each other, thus canceling everything that can be said, but by a single discourse that says everything while contradicting nothing. This synthetic discourse can only re-say what the Anti-thesis said. But, as a result, it will also re-say the Thesis, which has already been re-spoken by the Anti-thesis, due to the fact that it was denied by the latter. Only, by relegating the Thesis to a Past without a presence to come, the synthetic discourse will not contradict it (with a view to the Future) in the Present where it will itself be present, contrary to what the Anti-thesis did when its own presence was a Present. Thus, the actuality or the effective presence of the Syn-thesis relegates to a Past (without present future) not only the Thesis without Anti-thesis, but also the latter, insofar as it contradicts by its presence the Thesis as a Thesis still present and not already past, as well as the Para-thesis, which presents itself only to re-present as co-present, to itself and between them, the Thesis and the Anti-thesis . Now, if the co-presence of the Thesis and the Anti-thesis (one of which is prior to the other, but which together exhaust all the possibilities of the Discourse as such), what is the presence of the Para-thesis (which is the set of discourses whatever they may be, reduced to the state of Virtual Discourse or Discursive Hypo-thesis, that is to say, reduced to the sole Intention-to -speak, constantly renewing itself, but never realising itself), is henceforth only a Past in relation to the Present where the Syn-thesis presents itself, & where this Present can have no other discursive Future than that of an “indefinite” re-presentation of this Syn-thesis itself. For unless we suppose that a fine day will come, when all will cease to understand in the evening not only all that had been said in the distant past, but also all that was still said on the morning of this very day, nothing can no longer be said without saying (or being able to say) that what is said, re-says what has been said, given that everything has already been said. But since we could say everything without contradicting anything, we haven’t contradicted what we said either. The Syn-thesis, which does not contradict anything, does not therefore cancel itself out as discourse, but is presented as a discourse in action. And since it re-says everything, it is any Discourse or Discourse as such that has been actualised in and by the actuality of the Syn-thesis. In other words, the Discourse ceases to be Hypo-thesis as soon as it is actualised as Syn-thesis (but not before). From now on, the Discourse in potential sup-poses the Discourse in action (which presupposes it): one can no longer have in the Present an intention to speak, in or for the Future, except with a view to re-saying ( in whole or in part) what has already been said in the Past. In a Past, moreover, where one contradicted, in a certain present, everything that one had said (in the past) in order to contradict everything that had been said before; so that all were silenced there by and for all. In the presence of such a contradictory or para-thetical universal silence, the desire was born to say in one and the same synthetic discourse all that one can say, without contradicting anything more. At the cost of great efforts, this discursive desire was one day fully and definitively satisfied. But since then, it is now enough to have it, to be able to satisfy it easily.
That said, I would like to sum up everything I previously said about the Dialectic in a single word, borrowed from Hegel’s own vocabulary. We have, in fact, said everything about “the Hegelian Dialectic” by saying that this Dialectic is an Aufhebung. Unfortunately, no translation of this common German word can render its triple meaning: suppression or cancellation, preservation and elevation or sublimation. This is why I am obliged to replace it with an artificial technical term, moreover compound, such as “dialectic-overcoming” for example. But we might find a much better solution. Be that as it may, we effectively sum up everything that can be said (without contradicting oneself) when speaking of the Dialectic (if not discovery, at least one which was definitively and completely brought to light by Hegel), if one says that the Syn-thesis dialectically suppresses the Thesis and the Anti-thesis (the Para-thesis “suppressing” itself in a non-” dialectical” manner, that is to say without “preserving” or “rising” above anything, including itself). Indeed, the Syn-thesis PRESERVES the Thesis, as one “conserves” the Past by “keeping” its memory (Er-innerung); but it REMOVES (in the sense of canceling) the Anti-thesis as a “contrary thesis”, even as a “negative” or “negative” Thesis of “Nihilism”, which does not present itself (anymore) in the actuality of the Present only to contradict what is actually said there in its very presence; it is thus that it RAISE itself above the Thesis (which it suppresses as present, but preserves, for the present to come, as past) and the Anti-thesis (which it suppresses in its negating presence, but retains for the future as re-saying everything it had said in its past, without however contradicting anything in its present), thereby RAISING the Thesis and the Anti-thesis above themselves, insofar as the Syn-thesis is itself this same ex-Antithesis, which henceforth no longer contradicts the Thesis, although it continues to suppose it in the future as having been contradicted by it in a present which is now definitively past.
TO BE CONTINUED. EDITED, ETC.
For a much larger discussion, where the history of philosophy itself unfolds itself through thus scheme – a text of 15, 000 words or so, you could try to see:
הערות שהיו סתם. שיהיו.
הערות שהיו סתם. שיהיו. ״רופאים החותכים, שורפים, דוקרים ומענים חולים, דורשים על כך שכר שלא מגיע להם לקבל״. הרקליטוס על רופאי שיניים (נערך שם, שם).מילים אחרות לבדיחה המרקסיסטית: ״את זה הדיאלקטיקה כבר פתרה״: עבור הגל, התוצאה של ה”דיאלקטיקה” הקלאסית של ה”דיאלוג”, כלומר הניצחון שזכה ב”דיון” מילולי בלבד, אינה קריטריון מספיק לאמת. במילים אחרות, “דיאלקטיקה” דיסקורסיבית ככזו אינה יכולה, לדבריו, להוביל לפתרון סופי של בעיה (כלומר, פתרון שנשאר ללא שינוי לכל עת), מהסיבה הפשוטה שאם אתה משאיר את הבעיה בדיבור, אתה לעולם לא תצליח “לחסל” סופית את הסותר או, כתוצאה מכך, את הסתירה עצמה; כי להפריך מישהו זה לא בהכרח לשכנע אותו. “סתירה” או “מחלוקת” (בין אדם לטבע מחד גיסא, או מאידך גיסא, בין אדם לאדם, או אפילו בין אדם לסביבה החברתית וההיסטורית שלו) ניתן “לבטל באופן דיאלקטי to done away with dialectically (כלומר, לבטל במידה שהם “שקריים”, לשמור במידה שהם “נכונים”, ולהעלאות לרמה גבוהה יותר של “דיון”) רק במידה שהם משוחקים ומוצגים במישור ההיסטורי של חיים חברתיים פעילים שבהם “מתווכחים” על ידי פעולות של עבודה (נגד הטבע) ומאבק (נגד בני אדם אחרים). אמנם, האמת היוצאת מתוך ה”דיאלוג הפעיל” הזה, הדיאלקטיקה ההיסטורית הזו, רק ברגע שהיא הושלמה, כלומר ברגע שההיסטוריה מגיעה לשלב האחרון שלה במדינה האוניברסלית וההומוגנית, וזאת מאחר שהיא מרמזת על סיפוק האזרחים החיים בה. שהרי, “סיפוק”, שולל כל אפשרות של שלילת פעולה, ומכאן של כל שלילה באופן כללי, ומכאן, של כל “דיון” חדש על מה שכבר נקבע. אך, אפילו מבלי לרצות להניח, עם מחבר הפנומנולוגיה של הרוח, שההיסטוריה כבר כמעט “הושלמה” בזמננו, אפשר לטעון שאם ה”פתרון” לבעיה היה, למעשה, היסטורית תקף או לפחות “תקף” מבחינה חברתית לאורך כל התקופה שחלפה מאז, אם כן, בהיעדר הוכחה (היסטורית) להיפך, וכי יש זכות לראות בו “תקף” מבחינה פילוסופית, למרות “הדיון” המתמשך של הפילוסופים על הבעיה. בכל הנוגע לזה, אפשר להניח שברגע המתאים, ההיסטוריה עצמה תשים קץ ל”דיון פילוסופי”, המתמשך והאינסופי, של הבעיה שהיא למעשה “פתרה”. הדיאלקטיקה לא פותרת כלום. רק ההיסטורי ה. /// אבל למה ככה? הנה, הגל, ומהפכות ישראליות. -1. זה בהיעדר זיכרון היסטורי (או הבנה) שמתקיימת לה סכנת התמותה של ניהיליזם או ספקנות, זו שתבטל הכל בלי לשמר דבר, אפילו בצורת הזיכרון. חברה שמבלה את זמנה בהקשבה לאינטלקטואל ה”נון-קונפורמיסטי” באופן קיצוני, שמשעשע את עצמו בכך ששולל (מילולית!) כל נתון (אפילו הנתון ה”סובלימטיבי” שנשמר בזיכרון היסטורי) אך ורק משום שהוא נתון, בסופו של דבר שוקעת לתוך אנרכיה לא פעילה והיעלמות. כמו כן, המהפכן שחולם על “מהפכה קבועה” השוללת כל סוג של מסורת ואינה לוקחת בחשבון את העבר הקונקרטי, למעט ההתגברות עליו לכאורה, מסתיימת בהכרח או באין של אנרכיה חברתית או בביטול עצמי, פיזית או פוליטית. רק המהפכן שמצליח לשמר או לבסס מחדש את המסורת ההיסטורית, על ידי שימור בזיכרון החיובי את ההווה הנתון, שהוא עצמו הדחיק לעבר על ידי שלילתו, מצליח ליצור עולם היסטורי חדש המסוגל להתקיים. או: 2. אם חיה, או אדם כחיה, מגיעה לצומת המסתעפת לשני כיוונים, הרי שהיא יכולה ללכת ימינה או שמאלה: שתי האפשרויות תואמות כאפשרויות, עוד שהן אפשרויות. אבל אם החיה באמת לוקחת את הדרך ימינה, לא ייתכן שהיא גם לקחה את הדרך שמאלה, ולהפך: שתי האפשרויות אינן תואמות כמי שכבר התממשו. חיה שיצאה בדרך ימינה חייבת לחזור על עקבותיה כדי לצאת לדרך שמאלה. גם האדם כחיה חייב לעשות זאת. אבל בתור אדם – כלומר, כהוויה היסטורית (או “רוחנית” או, טוב יותר, דיאלקטית) – הוא אינו חוזר על עקבותיו. ההיסטוריה לא חוזרת לאחור, ובכל זאת היא מסתיימת על הדרך שמאלה לאחר שהיא עלתה על הדרך ימינה. זה בגלל שהייתה מהפכה, זה בגלל שהאדם שלל את עצמו כמחויב לדרך ימינה, ולאחר שהפך, כך, להיות אחר ממה שהיה, שהוא סיים בדרך שמאלה. הוא שלל את עצמו מבלי להיעלם לחלוטין ובלי להפסיק להיות אדם. אבל החיה שבו, שהייתה בדרך לימין, לא יכלה לגמור בדרך שמאלה: לכן היא נאלצה להיעלם, והאדם שאותו היא מגלמת היה צריך למות. (זה יהיה נס אם מהפכה תוכל להצליח בלי שדור אחד יחליף את השני – בצורה טבעית, או פחות ! יותר אלימה). 3. בינתיים, החיה לקחה ימינה. פאנדר, זאוס! בקראטילוס של אפלטון, הרמוגנס שואל על השמות היפים הנוגעים למידות טובות; איננו יודעים אם הוא חושד שהמידות הטובות אינן אלא שמות נאים. לפי סוקרטס, אבל, “הדברים היפים” (ta kala) היו במקור “הדברים כביכול” (ta kaloumena), ו”שם” היה “הוויה שיש אחריה חיפוש”; כך שהביטוי של הרמוגנס, “שמות יפים”, מסמל “שאלות של הוויה כביכול.” עד כאן על ההוויה, ו-! ההוויה? ״עלות השחר״ היא כבר על הזמן אחרי ה-und, היכן שהיידה!-guerre, גר, ״שוכן״—היעדר של כל ספק אפשרי נראה בבירור, אך פורש בצורה גרועה, על ידי דקארט. למעשה ואצלנו, אין הבדל עקרוני בין המושג EGO למושג VASE. ברגע שהאדם “מבין” את המושגים המדוברים, הוא בטוח ללא כל ספק אפשרי, שהמשמעות VASE של המושג VASE, בדיוק כמו המשמעות EGO של המושג EGO, היא / is (“משהו” ולא “כלום”) . ההוויה של המשמעות EGO לא מרמזת יותר או פחות על קיומו של אגו ב-hic et nunc מאשר ההוויה של המשמעות VASE מרמזת על קיומו של אגרטל ב-hic et nunc. קיומו, כאן ועכשיו, של אגרטל או אגו מתגלה רק בתפיסה ועל ידי התפיסה/ in and by Perception (ושכוללת מה שנקרא בכתובים חוש פרופריוצפטיבי / proprioceptive). עכשיו, זה כלל לא משנה. אבל אם זה בכלל משנה, אז האגרטל ולא האגו (כי-) דקארט רוצה להסיר ספק מה- / להגיע אל ה- מציאות החיצונית, אז VASE מה-EGO. אז הנה בבקשה. ו- תודה גם לך. =+ אגב ה-vase בהתחלה: בפרודיה על דקארט, וולטייר כותב (“מכתבים פילוסופיים, 13”): “אני גוף ואני חושב: אני לא יודע יותר מזה” (או “זה כל מה שאני יודע על זה [je n’en sais pas d’advantage]” ). דקארט, איך אריסטו אמר? האדם הוא החיה היחידה שצוחקת. —זה מעניין לראות כמה הבורות שלנו אחורה היא ממש על הפונדמנטליסטים שמעולם לא קראנו. התער של אוקאם, שגם אותו או אפילו עליו, אף פעם לא קראנו באמת, נשמע כמו פרפרזה של פסקה מאריסטו, מהטופיקס (ככלים וכללים כלליים למחשבה של הפילוסוף כדיאלקטיקן) – בעבר, כמובן, כולם התחילו עם זה, ואריסטו היה ״הדוקטור של הכנסייה״: It is also a fault in reasoning when a man shows something through a long chain of steps, when he might employ fewer steps and those already included in his argument: suppose him to be showing (e.g., that one opinion is more properly so called than another, and suppose him to make his postulates as follows: ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: ‘there genuinely exists an object of opinion in itself’: therefore ‘the object-of-opinion-in-itself is more fully an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion’. Now ‘a relative term is more fully itself when its correlate is more fully itself’: and ‘there exists a genuine opinion-in-itself, which will be “opinion” in a more accurate sense than the particular opinions’: and it has been postulated both that ‘a genuine opinion-in-itself exists’, and that ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: therefore ‘this will be opinion in a more accurate sense’. Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends. אני לא יודע כלום על תערו של אוקאם. לא קראתי אותו, אעשה זאת בקרובֿ עכשיו, זה לומר, כשיש לי נקודת מוצא/עניין, ובזמן האחרון, וזה יהיה לתמיד, אני די עיקש בלהשאיר שמועות בגבולותיהן, כלומר, מקור שגוי, אך אם מפתה גם, אז אולי מקור שגוי למקור הקורא עצמו לקריאה, אבל אני יודע מהקונטקסט המתלהב של השמועות, כי העניין מאד פופולארי ב״פילוסופיה״ של כותרות- פילוסופיה עכשווית, כלומר, אקדמית, כאילו היה לעיצוב מינימליסטי של שולחן – אני לא יודע עדיין מה התער של המזדיין הזה אומר, אבל מעניין אם גם הוא מסתיים ב-caveat הבא של אריסטו: Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends. טוב נו. —מומחה לתקופה הכחולה של פיקאסו. לא, לא, זה לא כולל את התקופה הורודה, מה?! הייתה לו תקופה של rose, שו האדה רוז? טוב נו, כשם שאמרתי, אני מומחה בעל שם עולם לתקופה הכחולה של פיקאסו. כן, היה שם כחול, אבל זה לא מדוייק. אם אעז, אומר: התקופה הכחולה זאת התקופה שבה פיקאסו צבע את הציורים שלו בכחול. הופה! אני אצבע את השלכת בירוק?! סבבה! תודה פרופסור. היה מרתק איתך, אבל ממש. אף פעם לא חשבתי כך על התקופה הכחולה! אף אחד לא מסביר את התקופה הכחולה טוב כמוך! אני מכור לאיך שאתה מסביר את התקופה הכחולה! נכון שאף אחד לא מסביר את התקופה הכחולה טוב כמוהו? נכון?! שקט, סטודנט דביל, תהיה בשקט. [סטודנטים במדעי הרוח, איזה חנונים מגוחכים, למות]. This strange dynamics of the contradiction in religion amazes me. It is perhaps the radical opening to the Word into history, hence history, while having this combined with this radical closure to history as being implied from the Word from without history: /// From the moment that God wanted to create Man in his image, it was in a human body that he necessarily had to be incarnated (contrary to what certain theologians at the end of the Middle Ages asserted, more or less seriously, perhaps following Origen). In other words, in the “human nature” of Christ, the human essence is linked in a univocal and necessary way to the human body. This leads us to admit that this link is just as necessary in all men, whatever they may be, being the same everywhere and always, that is to say, even after death and, possibly, before birth. But the arbitrary character of the Incarnation, that is to say of the real presence of the Spirit in the World, incites us to introduce into a purely human man an element that is always “free” from the necessary link between the “human soul” (essence) and the “human animal” (body). Thus, while admitting “secular” Hellenic or scientistic anthropology, Christian Theology affirms “alongside” a “magical” anthropo-theism which contradicts this anthropology in toto and always, that is to say, even after death and possibly before birth. But the arbitrary character of the Incarnation, that is to say of the real presence of the Spirit in the World, encourages us to introduce into purely human man a “sovereign” or “free” element vis-à-vis the necessary connection between the essence “human soul” and the body “human animal”. Thus, while admitting “secular” Hellenic or scientistic anthropology, Christian Theology affirms “on the side” a “magical” anthropo-theism which contradicts this anthropology. //// Today, and as if all changes are being adjusted and accounted for, I have found a similar dynamics in Buddhism, in a sense, that is; and we have this, of course (my hand is hurting. I hit the keys like crazy)///: Theology [which implies, by definition, as a “strange body”, the “divine [?] word”, revealed by a Revelation that is certainly discursive, but not “deducible” from the set of strictly human theological discourses, which are nevertheless supposed to have and be able [?] to develop in a coherent [?] way the (discursive) meaning of the revealed notions (and the notion of Revelation); now, this is an obvious contradiction, but it is this contradiction which leads back to Revelation. Or: it is the imperfect or incomplete character of this development, even the incoherence of the development, which brings Theology to perfect itself, by ending with a return to its starting point, being interpreted as a revelation of the fact that the revealed meaning necessarily involves non-discursive or non-developable elements in and through coherent discourse] seems to have first come to light on the occasion of Christology, including the dogmas of the incarnation of the Logos. and of the crucifixion of Jesus, that is to say, of the historical event par excellence, which was this death, supposed to have been violent, but voluntary and highly conscious, not only from the beginning of the torture until its end, but still as a project or pre-vision, if not desired, at least admitted and “verified” with full knowledge of the facts. /// Okay, and this is okay: some things should be said, whatever.—2 Possible Introductory Notes to Plato’s Possible Introductions. 1. In the present state of things, it is practically impossible to justify an exposition of Platonic philosophy by quotations. We know only the Dialogues of Plato. Now, these are all or almost all polemical, and they have this particularity that the doctrine of Plato himself appears in them only between the lines. Plato conceals it on purpose, because its discovery by the reader (or the listener) is supposed to be a touchstone of his philosophical aptitudes. Often, the opinions of the adversaries whom Plato criticises are presented in such a way (especially when the dialogue is led by someone other than Socrates: Stranger of Elea, Timaeus, Critias, etc.) that one can perfectly identify these opinions, at least at first sight, with an authentic Platonic doctrine, especially if one does not take sufficient account of the Socratic “irony” and the “joke” (paidia) of Plato. We can therefore produce “quotes” in support of almost any interpretation or misinterpretation of Platonism. Under these conditions, it would be better to give up quoting Plato as long as an adequate interpretation of each of his Dialogues does not establish the authentic meaning (Platonic or not) and the scope (ironic, pleasant or “serious”) of each word in it (i.e., the great project of Leo Strauss, Jacob Klein, etc., except that there is no etc.). However, such an interpretation has barely begun. Therefore, when I quote Plato in what follows, I ask the reader to trust me with regard to the interpretation of the quoted passages. For there can be no question of justifying the proposed interpretation of the Platonic texts in the present work. Moreover, an informed reader will see that my interpretation often deviates greatly from the traditional interpretation. /// To begin with, and with respect of the dialogues, let us say the following: it could be said that each of Plato’s Dialogues is an “image” of that curious (and in no way “obvious”) way of seeing things, according to which one can speak the truth only if one is silent [as well], while being able to be “truly” [that is, humanly] silent only to the extent that one speaks [not of Silence itself (which would in no way be contra-dictory), but further of that of which one is silent (which is contra-dictory to the extent that that silence is “justified” by the assertion that it is impossible to speak of it)]. Indeed, in every true Dialogue, an explicitly discursive Thesis is opposed to an Anti-thesis, which itself also is explicitly discursive. But in a Platonic Dialogue (which is an au- thentic Dialogue), the discursive Synthesis is never made explicit. It is present only implicitly in the discourse put into dia-logue form ((dia- logué)), and it belongs to the hearer or reader of the Dialogue to make it explicit. Now, if the interlocutors of the Dialogue speak, their hearers (for the Platonic Dialogues were spoken or “played” during the lifetime of their author) are silent. It is therefore in silence or from Silence that the one, unique Truth springs forth, begotten by the clash of the two “contrary” discursive Opinions. But this Truth is Knowledge only to the extent that it is itself discursive. That is where the Contra-diction in Platonic Theology resides. / From here, to begin the discourse. To go to: dialectics-ontology. /// 2. If we only knew Plato through the texts of Aristotle, we would have the impression of dealing with a second-rate philosopher, belonging to the so-called “Pythagorean” School, but with an eclectic tendency. On the one hand, under the influence of a certain Cratylus, Plato would have tried to combine Pythagorism with Heracliteism, by way of purely terminological modifications, without even trying to solve the fundamental problems involved. Moreover, that Plato would also have been influenced by Socrates. But his orientation, both Pythagorean and Heraclitean, did not allow him to properly understand what the latter wanted: whence the absurd theory of Ideas which substantialises the Socratic Universals and situates them, one does not really know where, outside the Cosmos, like so many objects supposed to be “eternal”, but in fact modelled on the things of this world (cf. Met., 1078b, 30-10794, 3). In short, taking Aristotle literally, one might have thought that the so-called Plato distinguished himself by a verbalism which is eclectic to the point of being incoherent and which contributes nothing to the real solution of the philosophical problems. Aristotle spent twenty years with Plato and devoted so many pages to him (it is true, all “critical”) in his own works. But we would, on the other hand, understand very well why Tradition speaks to us of rather tense relations between the Pupil and the Master (which is not contradicted, incidentally, nor by the famou but dubious Elegy from Aristotle to Eudimus, nor by the famous but inconclusive testimonial of friendship found in the Nicomachean Ethics). However, all this is only pure appearance, and even without knowing the works of Plato, one could see, just by reading what Aristotle says about them, the exceptional importance of the latter for philosophical history. For, as I will try to show, the three Aristotelian texts quoted above suffice to show that Plato was the first to develop the thetical Para-thesis of Philosophy. As for the so-called “Pythagoreanism” of Plato, it is very difficult to say, since we know almost nothing of the “pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism.” In any case, what Aristotle tells us about it (with the obvious intention of diminishing Plato’s originality) is quite contradictory. On the one hand (ibid., 9875, 12), he claims that Platonic Participation is just another name for Pythagorean Imitation. But, on the other hand (ibid., 9876, 28-30), he says that for the Pythagoreans the Numbers (moreover mathematical) are constituent-elements of the sensible Things themselves, whereas, for Plato, the Numbers (both mathematical and ideals, even numbered-Ideas) are separated from Things or transcendent in relation to their whole (which is the spatio-temporal Cosmos). Now, it is precisely this transcendence which makes the set of Ideas (which is the eternal Cosmos noetos) a manifestation of the parathetico-thetic Concept and therefore, of Plato, a very great philosopher. On the other hand, we can very well speak of Pythagorean atomic-numbers or numerical-atoms without speaking at all of Concept, whatever it is, that is, to say anything truly philosophic. It is thus, for example, that “Timaeus” (- Eudoxus) constructs a Cosmos where one can do everything except talk about it and where there is no place for the Concept itself nor for Philosophy which talks about it. In other words, the so-called “Pythagoreans” contemporaries of Plato may very well have been not philosophers, but pure “Scholars of the Democritean type, who were concerned only with Physics properly speaking, that is to say, with Energo-metrie (or more exactly, given the time, of Energo-graphy). Be that as it may, we can without great damage (even “historical”) completely neglect the alleged & Pythagorean sources a of Plato and retain only the “influence” of Socrates, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, that of (direct or indirect) Heraclitus, to which must be added that of Parmenides. / That I have already done.—2 Notes. Plato’s Mathematics.1. The religious character of Platonic Theology also explains why Plato presented Mathematics, not as a simple “degeneracy” of Energo-logy, that is to say, as its trans-formation into metrics, but as something intermediate between this and Phenomenology or Phenomenometrics. In Plato, Energo-logy assures the link between Phenomeno-logy and an Onto-logy understood as a religious one, that is to say, as a transcendent “Axiology”. This is why his Energo-logy is “ideal” or “animist”, and not “atomist” or “material”. In other words, the Platonic Ideas are also religious values, that is, non-quantifiable values. Moreover, in Plato, there is only an ideal pseudometry. The notion of the Idea certainly degenerates into a symbol when it is deprived of its meaning and Plato calls these symbols “Numbers”. But he is careful to specify that these are “ideal numbers” which, precisely, cannot be divided and cannot be added together (being many ordinals). Now, Aristotle rightly remarks that such “Numbers” have nothing to do with ordinary mathematical numbers (cardinals). And Plato recognises this himself, since he inserts the mathematical Numbers between these ideal Numbers and the concrete magnitudes, which are measured phenomena. Thus, from the psychological point of view, Plato’s “systematic” errors relating to Mathematics are explained by his basic religious attitude: by understanding Onto-logy as a Theology, he necessarily had to exclude Mathematics from it and reject them in Energo-logy; but the religious (“ideal”) character of the latter did not allow the introduction of Mathematics properly so called; the latter obviously not being able to be considered as a degeneration of Phenomenology, Plato was obliged to introduce into his System a “mezzanine” in order to house there “pure” Mathematics.=2Plato’s “error” relating to the “systematic situation of Mathematics gave rise not only to the “negative criticism” of Aristotle, but also to attempts at “positive criticism”, even a reworking of the Platonist System inside the Academy. According to Aristotle, Speusippus seems to have drawn the consequence of the transcendence of the Platonic Ideal World by identifying Ideas with “mathematical” Numbers. From the point of view of Mathematics itself, it was an “improvement on Platonism.” But, from the point of view of Philosophy, it was either an “incoherence” or a relapse into the Parmendian Thesis. For if Speusippus had identified the mathematical World with the Being-given, he would have rediscovered the systematic construction “on two floors without the beautiful floor” of Parmenides (while discovering in Philosophy the “mathematical” character of the Being-given). But he didn’t. He kept the Platonic construction “on three levels, because he kept the ex-Ideas that had become Planets in the same situation that Plato assigned to his ideal World “between” the empirical Cosmos and the doubly transcendent Parmenidean One. In other words, Speusippus retained the Platonic location of the Ideal World, but he dislodged the Ideas from it or, more exactly, he suppressed them as Ideas, retaining in a way only their numbers, which thereby ceased. to be “ideal”, and became ordinary “mathematical” Numbers or, at least, were supposed to become. But, in fact, it is the whole Platonic system which thus becomes “incoherent”. No doubt we know very little about Speusippus. But judging from the Epinomis of his friend Philippe d’Opus, as well as from the falsifications carried out by the editors (?) of the Laws, the Sciences benefited very little from the so-called “mathematisation” of the Platonic Ideas by Speusippus, while Philosophy in general and Platonism in particular suffered greatly from it. The fact is that Speusippus was, it seems, the first to take Plato’s Myths literally. The “imaginary description” of the ideal World ceased to be considered as “imaginary”, even fictitious, and passed itself off as an Energogology forming an integral part of the “Platonic” philosophical System properly called. Doubtless, by suppressing the Ideas, Speusippus must have eliminated the Platonic images which relate to them. But he did so only to put in their place a “magic of numbers” and an “astral religion” which were taken up by Neo-Platonism and which there took on, in a Jambilic, a distinctly “paranoid” character. But it does not seem that the Old Academy let itself be taken in by this. Xenocrates seems to have seen the danger of the “Speusippian” suppression of the Ideas of Plato. He therefore reintroduced them into the trap (in any case, System, while merging them with Numbers, which would also be both “ideal” or “conceptual” and “able mathematics”, even “metric”). But we do not see how Xenocrates could have succeeded in such an attempt at “fusion” and we do not know, in any case, anything precise on this subject. We only know that Aristotle thought nothing good of this second attempt to “reform” Platonism; he even says that it leads to a result which is “worse” than the Platonism reformed by Speusippus and than the original Platonism of Plato himself (cf. Met., 10836, 1). Moreover, these attempts had no future within the Academy, which soon sank into “scepticism”.3 MORE, perhaps:1Plato’s continuum theory and its solution to Zeno’s “paradox”. According to Plato, the Continuum (- Heraclitean River) would be resolved into pure Nothingness if it were not consolidated by a series of fixed and stable points, which are whole numbers (odd). The Aristotle-Brouwer theory applies to everything between landmarks. But each of these must be “defined” in itself and not as an “in-between” (“Dedekind cut”). We must therefore complete the Aristotelian (or Brouwerian) “refutation” of Zeno by saying that Achilles indeed catches up with the Tortoise if the two are situated somewhere “between” 1 and 3. But if the Tortoise is in 3 and Achilles is in 1, the great warrior does not catch up with the Tortoise, for the simple reason that neither of the two could move (it is to this theory of the continuum that the passage from the Timaeus seems to allude which says that the Atlantis was formerly attached to the Continent by a series of islands allowing it to be reached without getting lost in the Sea without shores (cf. Tim., 24, e-25, a and Crit., III, b). 2If the Dyad (the indefinite) is the “principle” of Multiplicity as such (which, moreover, only becomes truly quantitative when it ceases to be qualitative), it must be said that there is a multiplicity in each Number, even odd (that is to say in each Idea). Indeed, the “reason” for the difference between these numbers of the multi-odd is two, just as it is the case of the Even Numbers, which is a “multiple” by definition (3-1=5-3=2 and 4-2=6-4=2). The Dyad is, therefore, constitutive of the multiplication of all Numbers, odd or not, and therefore of their “order”, as well as “internal multiplicity”. However, each even Number is multiple (double) also in itself, while the odd Numbers imply “duality” (multiplying) only in and by their reciprocal relations.3In dealing with the Platonic Ideo-logy, one must carefully avoid misunderstandings that can easily arise. It does not act, for Plato, to “deduce” the set of Ideas from a “combination” of the notions of the One and the Dyad-indefinite. As doubly transcendent Theos, the One is both silent and ineffable: it does not “reveal itself” (“instantly” or sense of “punctually”, i.e. as a pseudo-hic and nunc without extension, nor duration) than in and by silent Ecstasy. Now, we cannot “deduce” anything discursively from the Silence; or, which comes to the same thing, we can “deduce” anything or everything from it. This is precisely why Plato does not admit human Wisdom (that is to say, the System of Knowledge), at least during the lifetime of man. [In Aristotle, the situation is different, because if the Nous is silent, it is not ineffable, at least not as Prime mover, that is to say, insofar as it is “embodied” in Matter-“ether” as Ouranos; the “induction” which leads from the sublunar World, through the celestial World, to the Nous understood as the Immobile-Motor, can therefore (at least in principle) be “reversed into a” deduction which “deduces” from the Prime-Motor first the ‘second’ immobile-Motors and then (via the Ecliptic) the Motors ’embodied’ in ‘elementary’ Matter; it is this “deduction” which is discursive Wisdom or the System of Knowledge.] As for Plato’s indefinite Dyad, it can serve just as well as the starting point of a “deduction” as Aristotle’s Hyle. Taken by themselves, the Dyad and the Hyle are pure Nothingness, hence, once more, silent or Ineffable. As a constituent element of Discourse, the Dyad is the Negation or the No [while the Hyle is the “middle term”, logically “excluded”, between the Positive and the Negative, being one and the other ” at the same time” (although only one of the two “contraries” is in it entirely”, the other being only “in potentiality”).] Applied to One, the No becomes the Not-one or the Multiple as such (moreover discursive), the One thereby becoming the Non-multiple or the Unity, also discursive. The One being “without quality”, the Multiple (as Not-one is purely qualitative), each Unit of this Multiplicity being qualitatively different from all the others; the differentiation is that of the Identical, that is to say, of a spatialization. Taken thus, the Dyad is Spatiality [and it is then the counterpart of the Aristotelian Hyle, which is also double in itself. However, spatial Units are no longer Ideas (atomic) since…they are “both ethereal AND elementary!”………//////// זהו, לא יכול עוד…3 SHORT SPECULATIONS 1. It is precisely the absence of Mediation that characterises both the Thesis and the Anti-Thesis of Philosophy. Because as soon as it speaks of Mediation (one mediates its statements, even demonstrates what it shows discursively), it is necessarily either (- first) Para-thesis (in so far as the Mediation is spatial or partially made), or (- finally) Syn-thesis or System of Knowledge (in so far as the Mediation is temporal or “total”, that is to say insofar as Philosophy shows everything, in de-monstrating everything it showed). Moreover, the Dialectical Scheme reveals this chrono-logy to us: the middle term B supposes the extreme terms of the “first”; and A is all that it is because it is the first” (which presupposes the “second without supposing it), just as B is what it is as “the second” (which supposes the “first” without presupposing it, since it denies it / say-it to the contrary). Therefore, the first philosophy could not but be thetic or ‘Parmenidean’, while the second had to be antithetical or ‘Heraclitean’. Only a third philosophy could be para-thetical and it had to be insofar as it was a Philosophy other than the two which preceded it. If, by impossibility, the order of the three philosophies had been other than the “dialectical” or chronological order, there would have been no history of Philosophy, but a succession in time of different discourses, which would not have “meaning” in the sense that the successive discourses could not be re-said in one and the same coherent discourse or one which is endowed with a unique and “definite” meaning (so that none of its constitutive-elements, that is to say, none of the successive discourses would have any meaning either). But if one wants to explain why the three successive philosophies were elaborated in determined hic et nunc, one must appeal to the “socio-historical” explanation. Finally, only “psychology” can make it clear why, for example, the Thesis was elaborated by Parmenides rather than by Heraclitus or any other Greek, contemporary and belonging to the same social milieu. 2. Here again, the Dialectical Scheme reveals the chronology. Because the fusion (discursive in and by the System of Knowledge) of three constitutive-elements supposes their distinction (discursive in and by Philosophy, properly speaking). In other words, the first “variant of the third philosophy could only be a thetic, that is, “Platonic” Para-thesis.3. The purely logical development of the Para-thesis is all the more difficult because it is necessarily contradictory in terms”. For it is very difficult to see whether a “contradictory” development is “correct” or not (this development being, moreover, “complete” as soon as it makes explicit the contradiction implied in the fundamental notion). Personally, I don’t think that a “non-Platonic” variant of the Thetical Parat-hesis is possible. Because if it were, we would certainly have found it in the more than two millennia history of traditional Platonism. It must be said, however, that the “correct” and complete distinction between what I call Onto-logy, Energo-logy and Phenomenology goes back only to Kant and that even today it is still far from being “clear”. Now, since the “specificity of traditional Platonism comes precisely from a certain confusion between Energology and Phenomenology, one cannot be sure that there is no “virtual” Platonism which would be based on a “Kantian” distinction of the three-logies. But again, this seems unlikely to me. For if such a variant existed “in potential”, why would it not have already been actualised, for example by Schelling, who was endowed with an undeniable philosophical “genius”. Generally speaking, I have the impression that the “phenomenalist” presentation of Objective-Reality, which constitutes the “specificity” of traditional Platonism, is an integral part of the “correct” (although “contradictory”) development. ”) of the Thetical Para-thesis as such. If this were so, then authentic Platonism would not admit “non-Platonic” variants.וזה תרנגול של פיקאסו. לא כחול. אבל היה לי מלא אריסטו לאחרונה וכתבתי מלא על תרנגולות. תקופת התרנגולות. שיירשם. זאת הייתה תקופת התרנגולות שלי.
הערה על פילון [[[בגלל שהוא בכל זאת יהודי לא עלינו, וזה קצר, ולא הכי פילוסופי בעולם (מבחינת שפה לפחות, אבל לא רק), אני תרגמתי (לא בלי עזרת גוגל) את ההערה (באנגלית) העוקבת (מבחינת סדר פוסט זה) את הטקסט בעברית (ההקשר הכללי שממנו נמתחה הערת הפוט-נוט הזאת היא דווקא אגב עוד ניסיון להראות כמה הסטואיקנים הם לא דתיים, ולמעשה המשך אותנטי פחות או יותר של אריסטוטליאניזם; וכן, הגל דומיננטי כאן; עוד ניסיון וכאמור, די בשוליים)]]]: הערה על פילון: אנו יכולים להצביע בהזדמנות זו על הדוקטרינה הפסאודו-סטואית של החכם שאנו מוצאים כי פותחה על ידי פילון ב-Quod omnis probus liber sit. במבט ראשון, פילון פשוט חוזר שם על מה שאומרים הסטואים (השוו עורך Loeb, כרך ט’, עמ’ 23): החכם הוא אינו עבד (מכיוון שהוא לא פוחד משום דבר, אפילו לא מהמוות) והוא גם לא מאסטר (שכן הוא אינו מחפש תהילה, כלומר הכרה על ידי אחרים) [למרות שהוא “מוכר” (אוטומטית) על ידי שאר החכמים]. אבל, למעשה, ועבורנו, בכך שהוא חוזר על דבריהם, פילון מתכוון למשהו אחר מזה שאליו הסטואים אכן מכוונים. עבורו, החכם הוא למעשה דתי, וזה, בהגדרתו, מאסטר (שכן הוא מוכן להקריב את חייו כדי להשיג או לשמור על הכרה (על ידי אלוהים) ועבד (שכן הוא מפחד מהמוות עד כדי כך בקשת חסד [מאת אלוהים] על מנת לשמר או להשיג חיים [נצחיים]). אם החכם הסטואי הוא אפוא תופעה בורגנית ספציפית (ההוויה הבורגנית ה”מושלמת”, יתרה מכך, האינטלקטואל), האדם הדתי הפילוני מסמל את האזרח: אלא שאלוהים ואלוהים בלבד אמור להיות מסוגל להעניק לו את ההכרה שהוא מבקש (במחיר כניעה מוחלטת וחד-צדדית, המניחה ומתנה את ה”הכרה” המיוחלת) יתרה מכך, האיש הדתי. של פילון דומה לחכם הסטואי, בזאת: גם הוא “חופשי” במובן של היותו “בלתי תלוי” ב”תנאים חיצוניים”. אבל אם החכם הוא “חילוני”, במובן שחייו כאן-למטה הם ” מאושרים” לא משנה מה הנסיבות שבהן הוא חי, האיש הדתי נמצא בכל מקום ותמיד “אומלל” בחיי העולם הזה (כאן-למטה), יהיו אשר יהיו, כאשר הוא יכול להיות “מאושר” רק בעולם הבא, כלומר לאחר מותו (שזה אפוא “טוב” ארצי). זה על התפיסה הדתית של “חכמה” שהתימות של היהדות, שאין להם שום קשר עם תפיסת האיש החכם הסטואית, מושתלות (על ידי) ב-פילון.
A Note ON Philo: We can point out on this occasion the pseudo-Stoic doctrine of the Sage that we find developed by Philo in Quod omnis probus liber sit. At first sight, Philo simply re-states there what the Stoics say (cf. ed. Loeb, vol. IX, p. 23 sq.): the Sage is NEITHER a Slave (since he fears nothing, not even death) NOR a Master (since he does not seek glory, that is to say, recognition by others) [although he is (automatically) “recognized” by the other Sages, who recognize him a-priori qua sage, as if a non-particular species of the SAGE, when he, as them, is otherwise too alone to be “recognized” by others; indeed, it is this state of affairs in its endurance (self-sufficiency) which make the a-priori “recognition” to be imagined as always-already in-existence]. But, in fact, and for us, Philo means something other than them by repeating them. For him, the Sage is in fact a Religious, and this one is, by definition, Master (since he is ready to sacrifice his life to obtain or maintain recognition (by God]) AND Slave (since he fears death to the point of asking for grace [from God] in order to preserve or obtain [eternal] life). If the Stoic Sage is thus a specifically bourgeois phenomenon (the “perfect” Bourgeois being, moreover, the Intellectual ), the Philonian Religious prefigures the Citizen: except that it is God and God alone who is supposed to be able to give him the recognition he seeks (at the cost of an absolute and unilateral submission, which presupposes and conditions the hoped-for “recognition.”) Moreover, the Religious man of Philo has this in common with the Stoic Sage: he is also “free” in the sense of being “independent” of “external conditions.” But if the Sage is “Secular,” in the sense that his life here below is “happy” whatever the circumstances in which he lives, the Religious man is everywhere and always “unhappy” in worldly life, whatever it may be, and can only be “blissful” in the hereafter, that is to say after his death (which is thus an earthly “good”). It is on the religious notion of “Wisdom” that the Judaic themes, which have nothing to do with the Stoic doctrine of the Sage, are grafted in Philo.