הערות שהיו סתם. שיהיו. ״רופאים החותכים, שורפים, דוקרים ומענים חולים, דורשים על כך שכר שלא מגיע להם לקבל״. הרקליטוס על רופאי שיניים (נערך שם, שם).מילים אחרות לבדיחה המרקסיסטית: ״את זה הדיאלקטיקה כבר פתרה״: עבור הגל, התוצאה של ה”דיאלקטיקה” הקלאסית של ה”דיאלוג”, כלומר הניצחון שזכה ב”דיון” מילולי בלבד, אינה קריטריון מספיק לאמת. במילים אחרות, “דיאלקטיקה” דיסקורסיבית ככזו אינה יכולה, לדבריו, להוביל לפתרון סופי של בעיה (כלומר, פתרון שנשאר ללא שינוי לכל עת), מהסיבה הפשוטה שאם אתה משאיר את הבעיה בדיבור, אתה לעולם לא תצליח “לחסל” סופית את הסותר או, כתוצאה מכך, את הסתירה עצמה; כי להפריך מישהו זה לא בהכרח לשכנע אותו. “סתירה” או “מחלוקת” (בין אדם לטבע מחד גיסא, או מאידך גיסא, בין אדם לאדם, או אפילו בין אדם לסביבה החברתית וההיסטורית שלו) ניתן “לבטל באופן דיאלקטי to done away with dialectically (כלומר, לבטל במידה שהם “שקריים”, לשמור במידה שהם “נכונים”, ולהעלאות לרמה גבוהה יותר של “דיון”) רק במידה שהם משוחקים ומוצגים במישור ההיסטורי של חיים חברתיים פעילים שבהם “מתווכחים” על ידי פעולות של עבודה (נגד הטבע) ומאבק (נגד בני אדם אחרים). אמנם, האמת היוצאת מתוך ה”דיאלוג הפעיל” הזה, הדיאלקטיקה ההיסטורית הזו, רק ברגע שהיא הושלמה, כלומר ברגע שההיסטוריה מגיעה לשלב האחרון שלה במדינה האוניברסלית וההומוגנית, וזאת מאחר שהיא מרמזת על סיפוק האזרחים החיים בה. שהרי, “סיפוק”, שולל כל אפשרות של שלילת פעולה, ומכאן של כל שלילה באופן כללי, ומכאן, של כל “דיון” חדש על מה שכבר נקבע. אך, אפילו מבלי לרצות להניח, עם מחבר הפנומנולוגיה של הרוח, שההיסטוריה כבר כמעט “הושלמה” בזמננו, אפשר לטעון שאם ה”פתרון” לבעיה היה, למעשה, היסטורית תקף או לפחות “תקף” מבחינה חברתית לאורך כל התקופה שחלפה מאז, אם כן, בהיעדר הוכחה (היסטורית) להיפך, וכי יש זכות לראות בו “תקף” מבחינה פילוסופית, למרות “הדיון” המתמשך של הפילוסופים על הבעיה. בכל הנוגע לזה, אפשר להניח שברגע המתאים, ההיסטוריה עצמה תשים קץ ל”דיון פילוסופי”, המתמשך והאינסופי, של הבעיה שהיא למעשה “פתרה”. הדיאלקטיקה לא פותרת כלום. רק ההיסטורי ה. /// אבל למה ככה? הנה, הגל, ומהפכות ישראליות. -1. זה בהיעדר זיכרון היסטורי (או הבנה) שמתקיימת לה סכנת התמותה של ניהיליזם או ספקנות, זו שתבטל הכל בלי לשמר דבר, אפילו בצורת הזיכרון. חברה שמבלה את זמנה בהקשבה לאינטלקטואל ה”נון-קונפורמיסטי” באופן קיצוני, שמשעשע את עצמו בכך ששולל (מילולית!) כל נתון (אפילו הנתון ה”סובלימטיבי” שנשמר בזיכרון היסטורי) אך ורק משום שהוא נתון, בסופו של דבר שוקעת לתוך אנרכיה לא פעילה והיעלמות. כמו כן, המהפכן שחולם על “מהפכה קבועה” השוללת כל סוג של מסורת ואינה לוקחת בחשבון את העבר הקונקרטי, למעט ההתגברות עליו לכאורה, מסתיימת בהכרח או באין של אנרכיה חברתית או בביטול עצמי, פיזית או פוליטית. רק המהפכן שמצליח לשמר או לבסס מחדש את המסורת ההיסטורית, על ידי שימור בזיכרון החיובי את ההווה הנתון, שהוא עצמו הדחיק לעבר על ידי שלילתו, מצליח ליצור עולם היסטורי חדש המסוגל להתקיים. או: 2. אם חיה, או אדם כחיה, מגיעה לצומת המסתעפת לשני כיוונים, הרי שהיא יכולה ללכת ימינה או שמאלה: שתי האפשרויות תואמות כאפשרויות, עוד שהן אפשרויות. אבל אם החיה באמת לוקחת את הדרך ימינה, לא ייתכן שהיא גם לקחה את הדרך שמאלה, ולהפך: שתי האפשרויות אינן תואמות כמי שכבר התממשו. חיה שיצאה בדרך ימינה חייבת לחזור על עקבותיה כדי לצאת לדרך שמאלה. גם האדם כחיה חייב לעשות זאת. אבל בתור אדם – כלומר, כהוויה היסטורית (או “רוחנית” או, טוב יותר, דיאלקטית) – הוא אינו חוזר על עקבותיו. ההיסטוריה לא חוזרת לאחור, ובכל זאת היא מסתיימת על הדרך שמאלה לאחר שהיא עלתה על הדרך ימינה. זה בגלל שהייתה מהפכה, זה בגלל שהאדם שלל את עצמו כמחויב לדרך ימינה, ולאחר שהפך, כך, להיות אחר ממה שהיה, שהוא סיים בדרך שמאלה. הוא שלל את עצמו מבלי להיעלם לחלוטין ובלי להפסיק להיות אדם. אבל החיה שבו, שהייתה בדרך לימין, לא יכלה לגמור בדרך שמאלה: לכן היא נאלצה להיעלם, והאדם שאותו היא מגלמת היה צריך למות. (זה יהיה נס אם מהפכה תוכל להצליח בלי שדור אחד יחליף את השני – בצורה טבעית, או פחות ! יותר אלימה). 3. בינתיים, החיה לקחה ימינה. פאנדר, זאוס! בקראטילוס של אפלטון, הרמוגנס שואל על השמות היפים הנוגעים למידות טובות; איננו יודעים אם הוא חושד שהמידות הטובות אינן אלא שמות נאים. לפי סוקרטס, אבל, “הדברים היפים” (ta kala) היו במקור “הדברים כביכול” (ta kaloumena), ו”שם” היה “הוויה שיש אחריה חיפוש”; כך שהביטוי של הרמוגנס, “שמות יפים”, מסמל “שאלות של הוויה כביכול.” עד כאן על ההוויה, ו-! ההוויה? ״עלות השחר״ היא כבר על הזמן אחרי ה-und, היכן שהיידה!-guerre, גר, ״שוכן״—היעדר של כל ספק אפשרי נראה בבירור, אך פורש בצורה גרועה, על ידי דקארט. למעשה ואצלנו, אין הבדל עקרוני בין המושג EGO למושג VASE. ברגע שהאדם “מבין” את המושגים המדוברים, הוא בטוח ללא כל ספק אפשרי, שהמשמעות VASE של המושג VASE, בדיוק כמו המשמעות EGO של המושג EGO, היא / is (“משהו” ולא “כלום”) . ההוויה של המשמעות EGO לא מרמזת יותר או פחות על קיומו של אגו ב-hic et nunc מאשר ההוויה של המשמעות VASE מרמזת על קיומו של אגרטל ב-hic et nunc. קיומו, כאן ועכשיו, של אגרטל או אגו מתגלה רק בתפיסה ועל ידי התפיסה/ in and by Perception (ושכוללת מה שנקרא בכתובים חוש פרופריוצפטיבי / proprioceptive). עכשיו, זה כלל לא משנה. אבל אם זה בכלל משנה, אז האגרטל ולא האגו (כי-) דקארט רוצה להסיר ספק מה- / להגיע אל ה- מציאות החיצונית, אז VASE מה-EGO. אז הנה בבקשה. ו- תודה גם לך. =+ אגב ה-vase בהתחלה: בפרודיה על דקארט, וולטייר כותב (“מכתבים פילוסופיים, 13”): “אני גוף ואני חושב: אני לא יודע יותר מזה” (או “זה כל מה שאני יודע על זה [je n’en sais pas d’advantage]” ). דקארט, איך אריסטו אמר? האדם הוא החיה היחידה שצוחקת. —זה מעניין לראות כמה הבורות שלנו אחורה היא ממש על הפונדמנטליסטים שמעולם לא קראנו. התער של אוקאם, שגם אותו או אפילו עליו, אף פעם לא קראנו באמת, נשמע כמו פרפרזה של פסקה מאריסטו, מהטופיקס (ככלים וכללים כלליים למחשבה של הפילוסוף כדיאלקטיקן) – בעבר, כמובן, כולם התחילו עם זה, ואריסטו היה ״הדוקטור של הכנסייה״: It is also a fault in reasoning when a man shows something through a long chain of steps, when he might employ fewer steps and those already included in his argument: suppose him to be showing (e.g., that one opinion is more properly so called than another, and suppose him to make his postulates as follows: ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: ‘there genuinely exists an object of opinion in itself’: therefore ‘the object-of-opinion-in-itself is more fully an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion’. Now ‘a relative term is more fully itself when its correlate is more fully itself’: and ‘there exists a genuine opinion-in-itself, which will be “opinion” in a more accurate sense than the particular opinions’: and it has been postulated both that ‘a genuine opinion-in-itself exists’, and that ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: therefore ‘this will be opinion in a more accurate sense’. Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends. אני לא יודע כלום על תערו של אוקאם. לא קראתי אותו, אעשה זאת בקרובֿ עכשיו, זה לומר, כשיש לי נקודת מוצא/עניין, ובזמן האחרון, וזה יהיה לתמיד, אני די עיקש בלהשאיר שמועות בגבולותיהן, כלומר, מקור שגוי, אך אם מפתה גם, אז אולי מקור שגוי למקור הקורא עצמו לקריאה, אבל אני יודע מהקונטקסט המתלהב של השמועות, כי העניין מאד פופולארי ב״פילוסופיה״ של כותרות- פילוסופיה עכשווית, כלומר, אקדמית, כאילו היה לעיצוב מינימליסטי של שולחן – אני לא יודע עדיין מה התער של המזדיין הזה אומר, אבל מעניין אם גם הוא מסתיים ב-caveat הבא של אריסטו: Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends. טוב נו. —מומחה לתקופה הכחולה של פיקאסו. לא, לא, זה לא כולל את התקופה הורודה, מה?! הייתה לו תקופה של rose, שו האדה רוז? טוב נו, כשם שאמרתי, אני מומחה בעל שם עולם לתקופה הכחולה של פיקאסו. כן, היה שם כחול, אבל זה לא מדוייק. אם אעז, אומר: התקופה הכחולה זאת התקופה שבה פיקאסו צבע את הציורים שלו בכחול. הופה! אני אצבע את השלכת בירוק?! סבבה! תודה פרופסור. היה מרתק איתך, אבל ממש. אף פעם לא חשבתי כך על התקופה הכחולה! אף אחד לא מסביר את התקופה הכחולה טוב כמוך! אני מכור לאיך שאתה מסביר את התקופה הכחולה! נכון שאף אחד לא מסביר את התקופה הכחולה טוב כמוהו? נכון?! שקט, סטודנט דביל, תהיה בשקט. [סטודנטים במדעי הרוח, איזה חנונים מגוחכים, למות]. This strange dynamics of the contradiction in religion amazes me. It is perhaps the radical opening to the Word into history, hence history, while having this combined with this radical closure to history as being implied from the Word from without history: /// From the moment that God wanted to create Man in his image, it was in a human body that he necessarily had to be incarnated (contrary to what certain theologians at the end of the Middle Ages asserted, more or less seriously, perhaps following Origen). In other words, in the “human nature” of Christ, the human essence is linked in a univocal and necessary way to the human body. This leads us to admit that this link is just as necessary in all men, whatever they may be, being the same everywhere and always, that is to say, even after death and, possibly, before birth. But the arbitrary character of the Incarnation, that is to say of the real presence of the Spirit in the World, incites us to introduce into a purely human man an element that is always “free” from the necessary link between the “human soul” (essence) and the “human animal” (body). Thus, while admitting “secular” Hellenic or scientistic anthropology, Christian Theology affirms “alongside” a “magical” anthropo-theism which contradicts this anthropology in toto and always, that is to say, even after death and possibly before birth. But the arbitrary character of the Incarnation, that is to say of the real presence of the Spirit in the World, encourages us to introduce into purely human man a “sovereign” or “free” element vis-à-vis the necessary connection between the essence “human soul” and the body “human animal”. Thus, while admitting “secular” Hellenic or scientistic anthropology, Christian Theology affirms “on the side” a “magical” anthropo-theism which contradicts this anthropology. //// Today, and as if all changes are being adjusted and accounted for, I have found a similar dynamics in Buddhism, in a sense, that is; and we have this, of course (my hand is hurting. I hit the keys like crazy)///: Theology [which implies, by definition, as a “strange body”, the “divine [?] word”, revealed by a Revelation that is certainly discursive, but not “deducible” from the set of strictly human theological discourses, which are nevertheless supposed to have and be able [?] to develop in a coherent [?] way the (discursive) meaning of the revealed notions (and the notion of Revelation); now, this is an obvious contradiction, but it is this contradiction which leads back to Revelation. Or: it is the imperfect or incomplete character of this development, even the incoherence of the development, which brings Theology to perfect itself, by ending with a return to its starting point, being interpreted as a revelation of the fact that the revealed meaning necessarily involves non-discursive or non-developable elements in and through coherent discourse] seems to have first come to light on the occasion of Christology, including the dogmas of the incarnation of the Logos. and of the crucifixion of Jesus, that is to say, of the historical event par excellence, which was this death, supposed to have been violent, but voluntary and highly conscious, not only from the beginning of the torture until its end, but still as a project or pre-vision, if not desired, at least admitted and “verified” with full knowledge of the facts. /// Okay, and this is okay: some things should be said, whatever.—2 Possible Introductory Notes to Plato’s Possible Introductions. 1. In the present state of things, it is practically impossible to justify an exposition of Platonic philosophy by quotations. We know only the Dialogues of Plato. Now, these are all or almost all polemical, and they have this particularity that the doctrine of Plato himself appears in them only between the lines. Plato conceals it on purpose, because its discovery by the reader (or the listener) is supposed to be a touchstone of his philosophical aptitudes. Often, the opinions of the adversaries whom Plato criticises are presented in such a way (especially when the dialogue is led by someone other than Socrates: Stranger of Elea, Timaeus, Critias, etc.) that one can perfectly identify these opinions, at least at first sight, with an authentic Platonic doctrine, especially if one does not take sufficient account of the Socratic “irony” and the “joke” (paidia) of Plato. We can therefore produce “quotes” in support of almost any interpretation or misinterpretation of Platonism. Under these conditions, it would be better to give up quoting Plato as long as an adequate interpretation of each of his Dialogues does not establish the authentic meaning (Platonic or not) and the scope (ironic, pleasant or “serious”) of each word in it (i.e., the great project of Leo Strauss, Jacob Klein, etc., except that there is no etc.). However, such an interpretation has barely begun. Therefore, when I quote Plato in what follows, I ask the reader to trust me with regard to the interpretation of the quoted passages. For there can be no question of justifying the proposed interpretation of the Platonic texts in the present work. Moreover, an informed reader will see that my interpretation often deviates greatly from the traditional interpretation. /// To begin with, and with respect of the dialogues, let us say the following: it could be said that each of Plato’s Dialogues is an “image” of that curious (and in no way “obvious”) way of seeing things, according to which one can speak the truth only if one is silent [as well], while being able to be “truly” [that is, humanly] silent only to the extent that one speaks [not of Silence itself (which would in no way be contra-dictory), but further of that of which one is silent (which is contra-dictory to the extent that that silence is “justified” by the assertion that it is impossible to speak of it)]. Indeed, in every true Dialogue, an explicitly discursive Thesis is opposed to an Anti-thesis, which itself also is explicitly discursive. But in a Platonic Dialogue (which is an au- thentic Dialogue), the discursive Synthesis is never made explicit. It is present only implicitly in the discourse put into dia-logue form ((dia- logué)), and it belongs to the hearer or reader of the Dialogue to make it explicit. Now, if the interlocutors of the Dialogue speak, their hearers (for the Platonic Dialogues were spoken or “played” during the lifetime of their author) are silent. It is therefore in silence or from Silence that the one, unique Truth springs forth, begotten by the clash of the two “contrary” discursive Opinions. But this Truth is Knowledge only to the extent that it is itself discursive. That is where the Contra-diction in Platonic Theology resides. / From here, to begin the discourse. To go to: dialectics-ontology. /// 2. If we only knew Plato through the texts of Aristotle, we would have the impression of dealing with a second-rate philosopher, belonging to the so-called “Pythagorean” School, but with an eclectic tendency. On the one hand, under the influence of a certain Cratylus, Plato would have tried to combine Pythagorism with Heracliteism, by way of purely terminological modifications, without even trying to solve the fundamental problems involved. Moreover, that Plato would also have been influenced by Socrates. But his orientation, both Pythagorean and Heraclitean, did not allow him to properly understand what the latter wanted: whence the absurd theory of Ideas which substantialises the Socratic Universals and situates them, one does not really know where, outside the Cosmos, like so many objects supposed to be “eternal”, but in fact modelled on the things of this world (cf. Met., 1078b, 30-10794, 3). In short, taking Aristotle literally, one might have thought that the so-called Plato distinguished himself by a verbalism which is eclectic to the point of being incoherent and which contributes nothing to the real solution of the philosophical problems. Aristotle spent twenty years with Plato and devoted so many pages to him (it is true, all “critical”) in his own works. But we would, on the other hand, understand very well why Tradition speaks to us of rather tense relations between the Pupil and the Master (which is not contradicted, incidentally, nor by the famou but dubious Elegy from Aristotle to Eudimus, nor by the famous but inconclusive testimonial of friendship found in the Nicomachean Ethics). However, all this is only pure appearance, and even without knowing the works of Plato, one could see, just by reading what Aristotle says about them, the exceptional importance of the latter for philosophical history. For, as I will try to show, the three Aristotelian texts quoted above suffice to show that Plato was the first to develop the thetical Para-thesis of Philosophy. As for the so-called “Pythagoreanism” of Plato, it is very difficult to say, since we know almost nothing of the “pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism.” In any case, what Aristotle tells us about it (with the obvious intention of diminishing Plato’s originality) is quite contradictory. On the one hand (ibid., 9875, 12), he claims that Platonic Participation is just another name for Pythagorean Imitation. But, on the other hand (ibid., 9876, 28-30), he says that for the Pythagoreans the Numbers (moreover mathematical) are constituent-elements of the sensible Things themselves, whereas, for Plato, the Numbers (both mathematical and ideals, even numbered-Ideas) are separated from Things or transcendent in relation to their whole (which is the spatio-temporal Cosmos). Now, it is precisely this transcendence which makes the set of Ideas (which is the eternal Cosmos noetos) a manifestation of the parathetico-thetic Concept and therefore, of Plato, a very great philosopher. On the other hand, we can very well speak of Pythagorean atomic-numbers or numerical-atoms without speaking at all of Concept, whatever it is, that is, to say anything truly philosophic. It is thus, for example, that “Timaeus” (- Eudoxus) constructs a Cosmos where one can do everything except talk about it and where there is no place for the Concept itself nor for Philosophy which talks about it. In other words, the so-called “Pythagoreans” contemporaries of Plato may very well have been not philosophers, but pure “Scholars of the Democritean type, who were concerned only with Physics properly speaking, that is to say, with Energo-metrie (or more exactly, given the time, of Energo-graphy). Be that as it may, we can without great damage (even “historical”) completely neglect the alleged & Pythagorean sources a of Plato and retain only the “influence” of Socrates, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, that of (direct or indirect) Heraclitus, to which must be added that of Parmenides. / That I have already done.—2 Notes. Plato’s Mathematics.1. The religious character of Platonic Theology also explains why Plato presented Mathematics, not as a simple “degeneracy” of Energo-logy, that is to say, as its trans-formation into metrics, but as something intermediate between this and Phenomenology or Phenomenometrics. In Plato, Energo-logy assures the link between Phenomeno-logy and an Onto-logy understood as a religious one, that is to say, as a transcendent “Axiology”. This is why his Energo-logy is “ideal” or “animist”, and not “atomist” or “material”. In other words, the Platonic Ideas are also religious values, that is, non-quantifiable values. Moreover, in Plato, there is only an ideal pseudometry. The notion of the Idea certainly degenerates into a symbol when it is deprived of its meaning and Plato calls these symbols “Numbers”. But he is careful to specify that these are “ideal numbers” which, precisely, cannot be divided and cannot be added together (being many ordinals). Now, Aristotle rightly remarks that such “Numbers” have nothing to do with ordinary mathematical numbers (cardinals). And Plato recognises this himself, since he inserts the mathematical Numbers between these ideal Numbers and the concrete magnitudes, which are measured phenomena. Thus, from the psychological point of view, Plato’s “systematic” errors relating to Mathematics are explained by his basic religious attitude: by understanding Onto-logy as a Theology, he necessarily had to exclude Mathematics from it and reject them in Energo-logy; but the religious (“ideal”) character of the latter did not allow the introduction of Mathematics properly so called; the latter obviously not being able to be considered as a degeneration of Phenomenology, Plato was obliged to introduce into his System a “mezzanine” in order to house there “pure” Mathematics.=2Plato’s “error” relating to the “systematic situation of Mathematics gave rise not only to the “negative criticism” of Aristotle, but also to attempts at “positive criticism”, even a reworking of the Platonist System inside the Academy. According to Aristotle, Speusippus seems to have drawn the consequence of the transcendence of the Platonic Ideal World by identifying Ideas with “mathematical” Numbers. From the point of view of Mathematics itself, it was an “improvement on Platonism.” But, from the point of view of Philosophy, it was either an “incoherence” or a relapse into the Parmendian Thesis. For if Speusippus had identified the mathematical World with the Being-given, he would have rediscovered the systematic construction “on two floors without the beautiful floor” of Parmenides (while discovering in Philosophy the “mathematical” character of the Being-given). But he didn’t. He kept the Platonic construction “on three levels, because he kept the ex-Ideas that had become Planets in the same situation that Plato assigned to his ideal World “between” the empirical Cosmos and the doubly transcendent Parmenidean One. In other words, Speusippus retained the Platonic location of the Ideal World, but he dislodged the Ideas from it or, more exactly, he suppressed them as Ideas, retaining in a way only their numbers, which thereby ceased. to be “ideal”, and became ordinary “mathematical” Numbers or, at least, were supposed to become. But, in fact, it is the whole Platonic system which thus becomes “incoherent”. No doubt we know very little about Speusippus. But judging from the Epinomis of his friend Philippe d’Opus, as well as from the falsifications carried out by the editors (?) of the Laws, the Sciences benefited very little from the so-called “mathematisation” of the Platonic Ideas by Speusippus, while Philosophy in general and Platonism in particular suffered greatly from it. The fact is that Speusippus was, it seems, the first to take Plato’s Myths literally. The “imaginary description” of the ideal World ceased to be considered as “imaginary”, even fictitious, and passed itself off as an Energogology forming an integral part of the “Platonic” philosophical System properly called. Doubtless, by suppressing the Ideas, Speusippus must have eliminated the Platonic images which relate to them. But he did so only to put in their place a “magic of numbers” and an “astral religion” which were taken up by Neo-Platonism and which there took on, in a Jambilic, a distinctly “paranoid” character. But it does not seem that the Old Academy let itself be taken in by this. Xenocrates seems to have seen the danger of the “Speusippian” suppression of the Ideas of Plato. He therefore reintroduced them into the trap (in any case, System, while merging them with Numbers, which would also be both “ideal” or “conceptual” and “able mathematics”, even “metric”). But we do not see how Xenocrates could have succeeded in such an attempt at “fusion” and we do not know, in any case, anything precise on this subject. We only know that Aristotle thought nothing good of this second attempt to “reform” Platonism; he even says that it leads to a result which is “worse” than the Platonism reformed by Speusippus and than the original Platonism of Plato himself (cf. Met., 10836, 1). Moreover, these attempts had no future within the Academy, which soon sank into “scepticism”.3 MORE, perhaps:1Plato’s continuum theory and its solution to Zeno’s “paradox”. According to Plato, the Continuum (- Heraclitean River) would be resolved into pure Nothingness if it were not consolidated by a series of fixed and stable points, which are whole numbers (odd). The Aristotle-Brouwer theory applies to everything between landmarks. But each of these must be “defined” in itself and not as an “in-between” (“Dedekind cut”). We must therefore complete the Aristotelian (or Brouwerian) “refutation” of Zeno by saying that Achilles indeed catches up with the Tortoise if the two are situated somewhere “between” 1 and 3. But if the Tortoise is in 3 and Achilles is in 1, the great warrior does not catch up with the Tortoise, for the simple reason that neither of the two could move (it is to this theory of the continuum that the passage from the Timaeus seems to allude which says that the Atlantis was formerly attached to the Continent by a series of islands allowing it to be reached without getting lost in the Sea without shores (cf. Tim., 24, e-25, a and Crit., III, b). 2If the Dyad (the indefinite) is the “principle” of Multiplicity as such (which, moreover, only becomes truly quantitative when it ceases to be qualitative), it must be said that there is a multiplicity in each Number, even odd (that is to say in each Idea). Indeed, the “reason” for the difference between these numbers of the multi-odd is two, just as it is the case of the Even Numbers, which is a “multiple” by definition (3-1=5-3=2 and 4-2=6-4=2). The Dyad is, therefore, constitutive of the multiplication of all Numbers, odd or not, and therefore of their “order”, as well as “internal multiplicity”. However, each even Number is multiple (double) also in itself, while the odd Numbers imply “duality” (multiplying) only in and by their reciprocal relations.3In dealing with the Platonic Ideo-logy, one must carefully avoid misunderstandings that can easily arise. It does not act, for Plato, to “deduce” the set of Ideas from a “combination” of the notions of the One and the Dyad-indefinite. As doubly transcendent Theos, the One is both silent and ineffable: it does not “reveal itself” (“instantly” or sense of “punctually”, i.e. as a pseudo-hic and nunc without extension, nor duration) than in and by silent Ecstasy. Now, we cannot “deduce” anything discursively from the Silence; or, which comes to the same thing, we can “deduce” anything or everything from it. This is precisely why Plato does not admit human Wisdom (that is to say, the System of Knowledge), at least during the lifetime of man. [In Aristotle, the situation is different, because if the Nous is silent, it is not ineffable, at least not as Prime mover, that is to say, insofar as it is “embodied” in Matter-“ether” as Ouranos; the “induction” which leads from the sublunar World, through the celestial World, to the Nous understood as the Immobile-Motor, can therefore (at least in principle) be “reversed into a” deduction which “deduces” from the Prime-Motor first the ‘second’ immobile-Motors and then (via the Ecliptic) the Motors ’embodied’ in ‘elementary’ Matter; it is this “deduction” which is discursive Wisdom or the System of Knowledge.] As for Plato’s indefinite Dyad, it can serve just as well as the starting point of a “deduction” as Aristotle’s Hyle. Taken by themselves, the Dyad and the Hyle are pure Nothingness, hence, once more, silent or Ineffable. As a constituent element of Discourse, the Dyad is the Negation or the No [while the Hyle is the “middle term”, logically “excluded”, between the Positive and the Negative, being one and the other ” at the same time” (although only one of the two “contraries” is in it entirely”, the other being only “in potentiality”).] Applied to One, the No becomes the Not-one or the Multiple as such (moreover discursive), the One thereby becoming the Non-multiple or the Unity, also discursive. The One being “without quality”, the Multiple (as Not-one is purely qualitative), each Unit of this Multiplicity being qualitatively different from all the others; the differentiation is that of the Identical, that is to say, of a spatialization. Taken thus, the Dyad is Spatiality [and it is then the counterpart of the Aristotelian Hyle, which is also double in itself. However, spatial Units are no longer Ideas (atomic) since…they are “both ethereal AND elementary!”………//////// זהו, לא יכול עוד…3 SHORT SPECULATIONS 1. It is precisely the absence of Mediation that characterises both the Thesis and the Anti-Thesis of Philosophy. Because as soon as it speaks of Mediation (one mediates its statements, even demonstrates what it shows discursively), it is necessarily either (- first) Para-thesis (in so far as the Mediation is spatial or partially made), or (- finally) Syn-thesis or System of Knowledge (in so far as the Mediation is temporal or “total”, that is to say insofar as Philosophy shows everything, in de-monstrating everything it showed). Moreover, the Dialectical Scheme reveals this chrono-logy to us: the middle term B supposes the extreme terms of the “first”; and A is all that it is because it is the first” (which presupposes the “second without supposing it), just as B is what it is as “the second” (which supposes the “first” without presupposing it, since it denies it / say-it to the contrary). Therefore, the first philosophy could not but be thetic or ‘Parmenidean’, while the second had to be antithetical or ‘Heraclitean’. Only a third philosophy could be para-thetical and it had to be insofar as it was a Philosophy other than the two which preceded it. If, by impossibility, the order of the three philosophies had been other than the “dialectical” or chronological order, there would have been no history of Philosophy, but a succession in time of different discourses, which would not have “meaning” in the sense that the successive discourses could not be re-said in one and the same coherent discourse or one which is endowed with a unique and “definite” meaning (so that none of its constitutive-elements, that is to say, none of the successive discourses would have any meaning either). But if one wants to explain why the three successive philosophies were elaborated in determined hic et nunc, one must appeal to the “socio-historical” explanation. Finally, only “psychology” can make it clear why, for example, the Thesis was elaborated by Parmenides rather than by Heraclitus or any other Greek, contemporary and belonging to the same social milieu. 2. Here again, the Dialectical Scheme reveals the chronology. Because the fusion (discursive in and by the System of Knowledge) of three constitutive-elements supposes their distinction (discursive in and by Philosophy, properly speaking). In other words, the first “variant of the third philosophy could only be a thetic, that is, “Platonic” Para-thesis.3. The purely logical development of the Para-thesis is all the more difficult because it is necessarily contradictory in terms”. For it is very difficult to see whether a “contradictory” development is “correct” or not (this development being, moreover, “complete” as soon as it makes explicit the contradiction implied in the fundamental notion). Personally, I don’t think that a “non-Platonic” variant of the Thetical Parat-hesis is possible. Because if it were, we would certainly have found it in the more than two millennia history of traditional Platonism. It must be said, however, that the “correct” and complete distinction between what I call Onto-logy, Energo-logy and Phenomenology goes back only to Kant and that even today it is still far from being “clear”. Now, since the “specificity of traditional Platonism comes precisely from a certain confusion between Energology and Phenomenology, one cannot be sure that there is no “virtual” Platonism which would be based on a “Kantian” distinction of the three-logies. But again, this seems unlikely to me. For if such a variant existed “in potential”, why would it not have already been actualised, for example by Schelling, who was endowed with an undeniable philosophical “genius”. Generally speaking, I have the impression that the “phenomenalist” presentation of Objective-Reality, which constitutes the “specificity” of traditional Platonism, is an integral part of the “correct” (although “contradictory”) development. ”) of the Thetical Para-thesis as such. If this were so, then authentic Platonism would not admit “non-Platonic” variants.וזה תרנגול של פיקאסו. לא כחול. אבל היה לי מלא אריסטו לאחרונה וכתבתי מלא על תרנגולות. תקופת התרנגולות. שיירשם. זאת הייתה תקופת התרנגולות שלי.